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ABSTRACT 
The rules governing “benign” forms of race-conscious government 
action are easy to state but very difficult to apply in practice. A great deal 
of the difficulty arises from the lack of precision associated with the use of 
terms of art, such as “diversity,” “remediation,” and “affirmative 
action.” Each of these terms should have a concrete and separate 
meaning, but in reality often serve as mere synonyms; this lack of 
precision in nomenclature is not always accidental. Although broad 
majorities support efforts to increase “diversity,” race-conscious 
government action aimed at remediating past racial discrimination enjoys 
much more limited popular support. The general public‟s strong antipathy 
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toward remedial race-conscious government action provides a powerful 
incentive for government officials to mislabel remedial programs as 
resting on a diversity rationale. Unfortunately, however, mislabeling a 
remedial affirmative action effort as a non-remedial diversity program can 
and will lead to virtually automatic judicial invalidation of the program, 
notwithstanding the fact that a compelling interest in remediation might 
support the program. The federal courts should consider carefully whether 
demanding truth in advertising is a higher constitutional value than 
securing voluntary remedial efforts from local, state, and federal 
government entities to undo the continuing contemporary effects of past 
discriminatory behavior. Moreover, the Supreme Court cannot reasonably 
demand more accuracy from government entities in describing the 
rationale for race-conscious action than the Court itself observes; the 
most recent decisions from the Supreme Court, including both Justice 
O‟Connor‟s majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger and Justice 
Kennedy‟s critical concurring opinion in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District, both fail to deploy the argot of equality 
with exacting precision. Race is a difficult topic and plain talk about race 
is not easy for any government entity—including the federal courts. This 
state of affairs requires pragmatic realism, rather than empty formalism, 
in assessing the consistency of benign race-conscious government action 
with the equal protection mandate. In this regard, permitting government 
entities to defend benign race-conscious government action as resting on 
either remedial grounds or a combination of remedial and diversity 
concerns—regardless of a program's formal “diversity” label—would 
constitute a modest step in the right direction. 
INTRODUCTION 
The rules governing ―benign‖ forms of race-conscious government 
action are easy to state but very difficult to apply in practice. A great deal 
of the difficulty arises from the lack of precision associated with the use of 
terms of art, such as ―diversity,‖ ―remediation,‖ and ―affirmative action.‖ 
Each of these terms should have a concrete and separate meaning, but in 
reality often serve as mere synonyms. Lack of care in using this 
nomenclature is not limited exclusively to government officers of the 
executive and legislative branches, but also includes the federal courts.  
The general public‘s strong antipathy toward remedial race-conscious 
government action provides a key reason for this lack of accuracy in 
labeling remedial government programs; remediation of past racial wrongs 
constitutes a remarkably unpopular rationale for race-conscious 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/1
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government action. By way of contrast, however, broad majorities support 
efforts to increase ―diversity.‖ This political dynamic provides a powerful 
incentive for government officials to intentionally mislabel remedial 
programs as resting on the diversity rationale. Unfortunately, however, 
labeling a remedial effort a non-remedial ―diversity‖ program can and 
does lead to virtually automatic judicial invalidation of the program, 
notwithstanding the fact that a compelling interest in remediation might 
support the program. Indeed, in the plurality decision of Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District,
1
 the Louisville, 
Kentucky, public school district‘s ostensible ―diversity‖ program appears 
to have suffered this fate—despite a compelling argument in favor of the 
program on remedial grounds, the Supreme Court invalidated it on 
diversity grounds.
2
  
The federal courts should consider carefully whether demanding truth 
in advertising is a higher constitutional value than securing voluntary 
remedial efforts from local, state, and federal government entities to undo 
the continuing contemporary effects of past discriminatory behavior. The 
Supreme Court cannot reasonably demand more accuracy from 
government entities in describing the rationale for race-conscious action 
than the Court itself observes; the most recent decisions from the Supreme 
Court, including both Justice O‘Connor‘s majority opinion in Grutter v. 
Bollinger
3
 and Justice Kennedy‘s critical concurring opinion in Parents 
Involved,
4
 fail to deploy the argot of equality with exacting precision. Race 
is a difficult topic to discuss, and plain talk about race is not easy for any 
government entity—including the federal courts. This state of affairs 
requires pragmatic realism, rather than empty formalism, in assessing the 
consistency of benign race-conscious government action with the equal 
protection mandate. 
 
 
 1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); Meredith 
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). The Supreme Court reviewed the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit‘s decision in McFarland v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 416 
F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom., Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 
547 U.S. 1178 (2006), concurrently with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 
2005), cert. granted, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006). In consolidated appeals, the citation convention is to cite 
only to the first named case under review; in this instance, to Parents Involved. Accordingly, all 
subsequent citations in this Article to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Meredith, relating to the 
Jefferson County, Kentucky, public school district‘s racial diversity program, will appear as citations 
to Parents Involved. In a consolidated case argued and decided in tandem, as in this instance, a single 
opinion resolves both appeals. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746, 2749.  
 2. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752, 2754 (2007). 
 3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325–28 (2003). 
 4. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The question of permissible government use of ―benign‖ racial 
classifications remains an important, but doctrinally muddled, area of 
constitutional law. A great deal of the confusion arises because of the 
imprecision with which government officials, including judges, use terms 
of art such as ―diversity,‖ ―remediation,‖ and ―affirmative action.‖ 
Although each of these terms could refer to distinct and severable motives 
for government action that take race into account, a pronounced tendency 
exists among courts, commentators, and various government officers to 
use them as synonyms. Moreover, the Supreme Court‘s own invocation of 
―diversity‖ as a basis for race-conscious government action has not 
reflected a consistent and coherent use of nomenclature.
5
 
Such imprecision could have one or many root causes. Perhaps race is 
such a difficult and complex subject that straight talk about it simply is not 
possible, whether at the level of the local city government or at the 
Supreme Court. From this perspective, the nomenclature is intentionally 
imprecise and reflects an effort to render opaque that which, if transparent, 
might provoke unwanted attention or even public backlash.
6
 As Professsor 
Peter Schuck puts the matter with respect to one key term of art, 
 
 
 5. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (2003) (―It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first 
approved the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public 
education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants with high grades and tests scores has 
indeed increased. We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today.‖) (citation omitted); id. at 332 (―In order to cultivate a 
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be 
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.‖); Parents Involved, 127 
S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate 
interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.‖); id. at 
2797 (―This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an 
integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. . . . The decision today should 
not prevent school districts from continuing the important work of bringing together students of 
different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds.‖). The language in these cases invokes rather 
directly concerns rooted in ―equal opportunity‖ and ―non-discrimination,‖ rather than the notion that 
―diversity‖ somehow improves the quality of the government‘s educational efforts. Cf. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (―Ethnic diversity, however, 
is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a 
heterogeneous student body.‖); id. at 315 (―It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a 
specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic 
groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that 
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.‖). 
 6. See Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL‘Y 
REV. 1, 34 (2002) (arguing that ―the diversity rationale should be seen as little more than a rhetorical 
Hail Mary pass, an argument made in desperation when all other arguments for preferences have 
failed‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/1
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―[d]iversity, like equality, is an idea that is at once complex and empty 
until it is given descriptive and normative content and context.‖7 
There is, in all of this, something of a puzzle. As Professor Fred 
Schauer has explained, we expect judges to engage in principled decision 
making and to give the actual reasons that undergird a particular judicial 
pronouncement that the law is thus.
8
 As he puts the matter, ―[t]he minimal 
sincerity conditions of ordinary conversational practice thus indicate that 
the giver of a reason is, at least at the moment of giving the reason, 
committed to no less than one result other than the result that prompted 
giving the reason.‖9 Nevertheless, there is a substantial disconnect 
between the formal reasons given by Justice O‘Connor in Grutter and 
Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved, and the rules that follow from those 
reasons. Both cases bless efforts to promote ―diversity‖ even while 
adopting rhetoric strongly redolent of racial justice and the social 
imperative of affirmative action.
10
 
Schauer acknowledges that reasons do not always explain outcomes, 
suggesting that ―[p]erhaps there are things we can think but cannot write 
down.‖11 He asks, ―But why would a judge believe an outcome to be 
correct when it could not be explained by a reason?‖12 Schauer suggests 
that ―[o]ne possibility is that there is a reason for the result, albeit a 
legally, socially, or morally impermissible one.‖13 Schauer‘s examples of 
such reasons involve invidious racial discrimination,
14
 but one could 
postulate any motivation that does not square with a judge‘s formal (and 
previously published) legal commitments, including, for example, a rule 
that states government may not attempt to remediate general social 
discrimination for which it bears no particularized responsibility.
15
 
 
 
 7. Id. at 37. 
 8. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633–34 (1995). 
 9. Id. at 644. 
 10. See infra text and accompanying notes 26–39 and 91–94. 
 11. Schauer, supra note 8, at 652. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. (positing that a judge‘s inability to provide a reason for a decision might stem from 
the reason being illegimate, including, for example, ―that the plaintiff should win because the plaintiff 
is white‖). Schauer adds that a racially discriminatory reason for a judicial decision is a reason, but that 
―its social and moral unacceptability operates as a constraint [on the judge acknowledging it in a 
published decision].‖ Id. 
 15. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) 
(rejecting remediation of societal discrimination as a compelling state interest and opining that ―the 
purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims 
of ‗societal discrimination‘ does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons 
like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special 
admissions program are thought to have suffered‖); see also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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If a judge believed such remedial efforts to be appropriate in some 
contexts but not others, finding a principled line of demarcation might 
prove to be a difficult, if not impossible, judicial task. One response might 
be to maintain the formal rhetoric rejecting remediation of social 
discrimination, while at the same time giving a wink and a nod to 
thoughtful programs that have this purpose and effect notwithstanding 
being labeled efforts to promote ―diversity.‖ In taking such an approach, 
however, the Supreme Court, to borrow a phrase from Professor Bryan 
Fair, creates a jurisprudence ―on a collision course with itself.‖16 
In the context of benign race-conscious government action, the 
Supreme Court has identified only two ―compelling‖ government interests 
that can justify such measures: the remediation of past racial wrongs and 
the promotion of diversity in contexts where it could be relevant, such as 
in higher education, or where a government agency‘s ―operational needs‖ 
would be enhanced through a racially diverse work force.
17
 A significant 
problem arises, however, in the imprecise use of ―diversity‖ and 
―remediation‖ as justifications for race-conscious government action. 
Politicians, for perfectly sensible reasons, tend to hold fast to 
―diversity‖ as a rationale for race-conscious government action, even 
when, in reality, remediation or some combination of remedial and 
diversity motives serves as the basis in fact for government action.
18
 Both 
are compelling interests; both motives can support race-conscious 
government action.
19
 The problem is that an overt remediation rationale is 
 
 
469, 496–99 (1989) (rejecting remediation of general social discrimination as a basis for adopting an 
affirmative action plan for city construction contracts because ―an amorphous claim that there has been 
past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota‖).  
 16. See Bryan K. Fair, Re(Caste)ing Equality Theory: Will Grutter Survive Itself by 2028?, 7 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 721, 728 (2005). 
 17. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (holding remediation of past 
discrimination to be a compelling government interest); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–30 
(2003) (holding diversity to be a compelling government interest, at least in the context of higher 
education); see Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 938, 966–67 (2008) 
(discussing remediation and diversity as potentially compelling government interests sufficient to 
justify race-based government classifications). 
 18. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative 
Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1450–54 (2005) (noting reticence of the University of Michigan 
officials and lawyers to invoke remediation as a justification for race-conscious admissions programs 
at the college and law school); Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 171, 172–80 (2005) (noting reticence of government officials to acknowledge past 
discrimination as a basis for race-conscious government action and the intentional misuse of the 
diversity rationale precisely because it avoids any admission of past racially discriminatory 
government action). 
 19. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 18, at 1453 n.69 (―Theoretically, however, nothing prevented 
the university from offering a combined diversity and remedial justification for its race-sensitive 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/1
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much more likely to precipitate a political backlash from white voters.
20
 
Accordingly, there is a natural political pressure to misidentify remedial 
efforts as diversity efforts. Indeed, if the federal courts insist on the perfect 
use of the argot of equality, voluntary efforts to remediate the 
contemporary effects of past racial discrimination will simply not exist 
and any such remedial efforts will have to be judicially initiated or not 
initiated at all. 
In light of these political realities, perhaps the Supreme Court should 
permit governments to say one thing (―diversity‖) while actually doing 
another (―remediation‖). If both of these interests truly are compelling, the 
Supreme Court should not demand that form transcend substance. As an 
alternative, government entities should be permitted to invoke both 
diversity and remediation as justifications for benign race-conscious 
government action and courts should sustain such programs if the agency 
can make a persuasive case on either ground. Circling back to the Supreme 
Court‘s recent decisions, if one were to renormalize Meredith v. Jefferson 
County Board of Education as a continuing effort at remediation, the 
Jefferson County, Kentucky, Board of Education should be able to win its 
case if it were willing to defend its student assignment program on purely 
remedial grounds (or perhaps some combination of remedial and diversity 
grounds).
21
 
This Article begins, in Part I, with a brief overview of the current argot 
of equality: the rules that ostensibly govern the use of race-conscious 
government classifications—rules that, although easy to state, have proven 
difficult to apply in practice. Part II then examines the rationale most 
currently in vogue for adopting benign race-conscious government action: 
the diversity rationale. The problem with the diversity rationale, at least to 
date, is that it has come to serve as a de facto proxy for remedial 
 
 
admissions policies. Together, the two rationales might have offered a more compelling justification 
for affirmative action then either standing alone.‖). 
 20. See Jones, supra note 18, at 173–75, 179–80; Michael E. Rosman, Thoughts on Bakke and 
Its Effect on Race-Conscious Decision-Making, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 45, 47–52.  
 21. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 18, at 1453 n.69 (noting that the facts in Grutter supported 
asserting both remedial and diversity justifications for the law school‘s admission program and 
observing that ―many commentators view past and present discrimination as the true explanation for 
universities‘ commitment to racially diverse student bodies‖). But cf. Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a 
Dead End, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 705, 714 (2008) (―In fact, in the Grutter case, the University of Michigan 
consciously avoided the remedial argument altogether.‖). The logic of Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion in 
Grutter supports the view that the program could be upheld on remedial grounds; her concerns with 
visibly open paths to leadership and her firm conviction that race will not need to be considered in the 
future when making admissions decisions both bespeak a remedial, rather than diversity, rationale for 
sustaining the program against the equal protection challenge. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
343 (2003); see also infra text and accompanying notes 91–96. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
914 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:907 
 
 
 
 
concerns.
22
 Clearly there is a place for considering diversity, including 
racial diversity, in designing and staffing government programs. In some 
contexts, such as a police force or prison staff, a diverse work force can 
achieve results that a non-diverse group of employees simply cannot.
23
 But 
government entities have deployed routinely the diversity rationale in 
contexts where the government‘s main rationale for race-conscious action 
has very little to do with the identifiable benefits of including persons of 
particular races to achieving a particular goal or purpose. Instead, these 
intentionally mislabeled ―diversity‖ programs seek to promote remedial 
objectives that address our unfortunate history of government-sponsored 
racial discrimination and reflect deep-seated lingering doubts about the 
fundamental fairness of contemporary U.S. society. This Part argues that 
 
 
 22. See Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard College 
Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext?, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 407 (1979) (arguing that 
―[t]he raison d‘être for race-specific affirmative action programs has simply never been diversity for 
the sake of education,‖ but rather the diversity rationale is ―a clever post facto justification for 
increasing the number of minority group students in the student body‖); Lani Guinier, Admissions 
Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 
152 n.158 (2003) (―Admissions officers may have originally used race as one of these soft variables to 
compensate for past discrimination, but the Court has since disallowed the pursuit of this purpose in 
the educational arena except to remedy specific instances of formal and intentional discrimination.‖); 
Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic Excellence, 
and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2004) (―‗Diversity‘ is the settled judicial 
rationale for affirmative action, and the diversity label has the great virtue of applying throughout the 
country.‖); Nunn, supra note 21, at 709 (―When affirmative action policies were first implemented in 
the 1960s, they were invariably justified on remedial grounds.‖); Schuck, supra note 6, at 34 (noting 
that ―many of affirmative action‘s more forthright defenders readily concede that diversity is merely 
the current rationale of convenience for a policy that they prefer to justify on other grounds‖); see also 
Guinier, supra, at 120 (―Now, with the Court‘s imprimatur on affirmative action, perhaps those who 
still feel excluded will return the conversation to more foundational concerns about the democratic 
purpose of higher education.‖). 
 23. See infra text and accompanying notes 67–82; see also Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 
1111, 1113–14 (7th Cir. 2003) (sustaining race-conscious hiring and promotions in municipal police 
force because ―there is an even more compelling need for diversity in a large metropolitan police force 
charged with protecting a racially and ethnically divided major American city‖ than in college and 
university student admissions decisions). In fact, according to Chief Judge Richard Posner, law 
enforcement activities provide ―the very clearest examples of cases in which departures from racial 
neutrality are permissible.‖ Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original); 
see also Robert J. Delahunty, “Constitutional Justice” or “Constitutional Peace”?: The Supreme 
Court and Affirmative Action, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 64 (2008) (―‗Diversity,‘ in other words, 
was seen as a method of selecting applicants whose presence within the classroom (and to a lesser 
extent, on the campus) would create a richer mix of values, perspectives and experiences, and so 
improve the overall quality of the learning process.‖). But cf. Nunn, supra note 21, at 724 (criticizing 
the diversity rationale, at least in the context of higher education, for ―stigmatizing‖ people of color 
and arguing that the concept entails using ―people of color . . . as a means to white ends‖ and fails to 
engage meaningfully ―[t]he claims that communities of color might have against majority 
institutions‖).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/1
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efforts at remedial affirmative action and racial justice should not be, and 
constitutionally cannot be, pursued under the rubric of ―diversity.‖ 
Part III considers and critiques the most powerful rationale for race-
conscious government action: remediation of past discrimination by a 
government entity (whether the discrimination was through direct 
regulations or through participation in discriminatory institutions and 
markets).
24
 This Part deconstructs the remedial justification and 
demonstrates that, despite its powerful theoretical and legal standing to 
validate race-conscious government action, the remediation rationale has, 
at best, nominal political utility in the contemporary United States. Indeed, 
if one takes the notion of remediation seriously, remedial programs would 
have to be so highly targeted as to be incapable of securing sufficient 
popular support for enactment in all but the rarest of cases.
25
 This state of 
affairs in turn helps to explain why government entities deploy the 
diversity rationale so often in situations that, honestly appraised, reflect 
core remedial concerns. 
Part IV considers the catch-22 that the Supreme Court has constructed 
for local city councils, university admissions offices, and public school 
districts: misinvoke diversity as a rationale for race-conscious government 
action and the federal courts will invalidate the program; properly invoke a 
remedial rationale and face electoral annihilation or be unable to muster 
the necessary votes to establish the program in the first place. The 
Supreme Court has essentially created a framework that precludes 
accurately described race-conscious government action, which raises the 
question: should truth-in-advertising matter if a government entity can 
persuasively justify a program on either diversity or remedial grounds or 
some combination of both? This Article argues that the Supreme Court 
cannot logically demand more truth-in-advertising from government 
officials than it upholds and observes itself. Lawyers for government 
entities defending race-conscious programs should be permitted to defend 
such programs on any basis that the facts will support, even if it is not the 
basis reflected in the official legislative history of the enactment, which 
would presumably be replete with paeans to diversity and nary a peep 
regarding a remedial motive. 
Finally, the Article concludes that race is a difficult subject to discuss 
openly in the contemporary United States. Given the heavy cultural 
baggage associated with the history of race in the United States, notably 
 
 
 24. See infra text and accompanying notes 115–37. 
 25. See infra text and accompanying notes 123–30. 
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including slavery and a concerted multi-generational pogrom against the 
nation‘s native peoples, sustaining a reasoned discourse about race and 
racial justice is a very difficult, perhaps impossible, task. Constitutional 
law should take account of this socio-cultural reality in creating and 
enforcing the rules that define the metes and bounds of permissible 
government use of race. We should move beyond jabberwocky toward a 
form of pragmatic engagement that deals with race openly, but also 
realistically. The Supreme Court should not fashion and enforce equal 
protection rules and doctrines that essentially force government to fail 
when attempting to remediate past racial wrongs that continue to have 
contemporary social effects. 
I. THE DOCTRINAL CONTOURS OF PERMISSIBLE RACE-CONSCIOUS 
GOVERNMENT ACTION: MASTERING THE ARGOT OF EQUALITY 
Despite the internal inconsistencies within Justice O‘Connor‘s majority 
opinion in Grutter and Justice Kennedy‘s crucial concurring opinion in 
Parents Involved, the doctrinal framework for analyzing race-conscious 
government action is not difficult to state. Under existing equal protection 
precedents, government may use race-conscious classifications to grant 
benefits or impose burdens to remediate past racial discrimination
26
 in any 
context and to promote diversity in contexts where the government may 
plausibly claim some relationship between an ethnically diverse group and 
the attainment of the government‘s objectives;27 the Supreme Court has 
held that these two government interests, and to date only these two 
interests, meet the compelling state interest requirement. 
Turning to the first justification, the Justices have clearly ruled that 
remediation of past discrimination constitutes a compelling government 
interest justifying the use of racial preferences,
28
 even if the beneficiaries 
 
 
 26. See Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491–93 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 27. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328–30 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 
(2003); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311, 314–15 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.); see also Guinier, supra note 22, at 117 (―The [Grutter] Court determined that diversity is a 
compelling governmental interest that justifies certain considerations of race.‖). But cf. Sanford 
Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 577, 590 (2000) (observing that diversity ―has become 
the favorite catchword . . . of those defending the use of racial or ethnic preferences‖ but also noting 
that ―there is a debate about the relevance of diverse backgrounds to the quality of what is produced‖). 
 28. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (―The 
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against 
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from 
acting in response to it. . . . When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such 
action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the ‗narrow tailoring‘ test this Court has set out 
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of those preferences are not the specific persons against whom the 
government discriminated.
29
 As Justice Stevens has explained, ―race-
conscious remedies are obviously required to remedy racially 
discriminatory actions by the State that violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.‖30 Thus, even though equal protection rights belong to 
individuals and not to groups,
31
 the Supreme Court has consistently 
endorsed the use of group-based remedies to undo the contemporary 
effects of past discrimination.
32
 Remediation of the present-day effects of 
past discrimination is a potentially powerful and deep, but relatively 
narrow, rationale for the adoption of race-conscious government 
classifications.
33
 
―Diversity‖ provides the only other government interest that the 
Supreme Court deems sufficiently compelling to support race-based 
classifications. In 2003, the Grutter Court endorsed Justice Powell‘s Bakke 
opinion
34
 and held that colleges and universities possess a compelling 
 
 
in previous cases.‖); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion) (―The 
Government unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and present discrimination by 
a state actor.‖). 
 29. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167–70, 180–82; see also sources cited infra note 32. 
 30. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 31. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226–27 (explaining that the application of skepticism, congruence, and 
consistency rules for equal protection review of all government race-based classifications ―all derive 
from the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, 
not groups‖).  
 32. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 491–92; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. It bears noting that 
Justices Scalia and Thomas have consistently dissented from this perspective, insisting that only the 
actual victims of past discrimination may obtain a remedy for proven discrimination. See Adarand, 
515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment); Croson, 488 U.S. at 526–27 (Scalia, J., concurring). As Justice Scalia 
states the matter, ―there is only one circumstance in which the States may act by race to ‗undo the 
effects of past discrimination‘: where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system 
of unlawful racial classification.‖ Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring). By this, he means 
only that ―a State may ‗undo the effects of past discrimination‘ in the sense of giving the identified 
victim of state discrimination that which it wrongfully denied him—for example, giving to a 
previously rejected black applicant the job that, by reason of discrimination, had been awarded to a 
white applicant, even if this means terminating the latter‘s employment.‖ Id. at 526. For Justice Scalia, 
then, Richmond could award contracting preferences not to members of groups suffering past 
discrimination within the market, but rather ―to identified victims of discrimination.‖ Id. at 526–27; 
see Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (―Individuals who have been wronged by 
unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such 
thing as either a creditor or debtor race.‖). 
 33. See infra text and accompanying notes 152–211. 
 34. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (―We do not find it necessary to decide 
whether Justice Powell‘s opinion is binding under Marks‖ because ―for the reasons set out below, 
today we endorse Justice Powell‘s view in Bakke that student body diversity is a compelling state 
interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.‖). 
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interest in admitting and enrolling a diverse student body.
35
 Although 
Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion in Grutter purported to consider the 
University of Michigan Law School admissions program‘s use of race 
solely as a means of securing a diverse class, much of her opinion cleverly 
elides the rhetoric of remediation of the present-day effects of past 
discrimination, even as its internal logic evinces strong remedial 
motivations and concerns.
36
 After Grutter, the question of precisely how 
inclusive ―diversity‖ programs must be to survive equal protection review 
remained a very much open one. 
In 2007, however, a new majority, effectively led by Justice Kennedy, 
significantly narrowed the scope of the diversity justification for race-
conscious government action. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of 
Education
37
 constitute crucially important cases involving the adoption of 
voluntary racial-integration programs in the public schools for the purpose 
of advancing ―diversity‖ values. In its decisions, the Supreme Court 
invalidated both the Seattle and Louisville affirmative action plans, 
finding that both were insufficiently inclusive to meet the equal protection 
mandate of narrow tailoring.
38
 As a formal matter, however, the majority 
did not overrule or otherwise purport to limit Grutter‘s holding that 
diversity could be a compelling government interest in the field of 
education.
39
 
 
 
 35. Id. at 328 (―Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a 
diverse student body.‖). The decision on this point was actually 6–3, rather than 5–4, because Justice 
Kennedy, although dissenting as to the ultimate outcome of the case, agreed with the majority on this 
issue. See id. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (―There is no constitutional objection to the goal of 
considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity, but an educational 
institution must ensure, through sufficient procedures, that each applicant receives individual 
consideration and that race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions 
decisionmaking.‖). 
 36. See id. at 330–33 (noting the importance of a diverse leadership caste in industry, the 
military, and the legal profession and observing that ―[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to 
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity‖); id. at 342 (requiring, notwithstanding 
the ―diversity‖ rationale for race-conscious admissions, that ―race-conscious admissions policies must 
be limited in time‖). This internal inconsistency between the rhetoric of diversity and the rhetoric of 
racial justice has not gone unnoticed in the scholarly commentary on Grutter. See, e.g., Harry T. 
Edwards, The Journey From Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial 
Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944, 966–67 (2004); Fair, supra note 16, at 728, 760–61. 
As Judge Edwards aptly observes, ―[i]n articulating the importance of diversity to the experiences of 
American business and the military, Grutter, unlike Bakke, suggests a link between diversity and the 
ongoing quest for racial equality.‖ Edwards, supra, at 965. 
 37. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 38. Id. at 2753–54; id. at 2767–68 (plurality opinion). 
 39. See id. at 2753. To be sure, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality, finds that ―[t]he 
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Reaction to the decisions was swift and decisive; scholarly 
commentators, elected government officials, and civil rights leaders all 
criticized the majority‘s ruling as constituting a betrayal of Brown v. 
Board of Education
40
 and characterized it as a major setback in the effort 
to achieve some modicum of racial justice in the United States.
41
 The 
 
 
present cases are not governed by Grutter.‖ Id. at 2754. However, he clearly recites and seems to 
reaffirm the proposition that ―diversity‖ programs, at least if such efforts comprise ―part of a broader 
effort to achieve ‗exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints‘‖ in the 
educational context and are ―not simply an effort to achieve racial balance‖ may constitute a 
compelling government interest. Id. at 2753. At the same time, however, the Chief Justice plainly 
equivocates on answering directly whether the diversity interest Grutter validated in the context of 
higher education translates directly into the context of primary and secondary education. See id. at 
2754 (―The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on its holding—defining a specific 
type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher education—but these limitations 
were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in 
elementary and secondary schools.‖). Despite this language, however, Chief Justice Roberts then 
proceeds to undertake a careful and detailed examination of the specific diversity programs at issue, 
and faults them for lacking a sufficiently broad scope, rather than for failing to advance, even in 
theory, a compelling government interest. See id. at 2755–61. If diversity may never serve as a 
compelling government interest in the context of primary and secondary education, this entire analysis 
becomes wholly irrelevant; accordingly, the logical implication would be that diversity can constitute a 
compelling interest in this context. Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, squarely addresses the scope of 
Grutter and clearly opines that it extends to primary and secondary education. See id. at 2789 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (―Diversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a compelling 
educational goal a school district may pursue.‖). Thus, Justice Kennedy, joined on this specific point 
by the four dissenting justices, see id. at 2820–22 (Breyer, J., dissenting), establish a clear five Justice 
majority for the proposition that diversity may constitute a compelling government interest in the 
context of primary and secondary education—and this holds true regardless of the proper interpretation 
of the plurality opinion.  
 40. 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954) (overturning the doctrine of ―separate but equal‖ and requiring 
local public school districts to cease excluding students from particular public schools on account of 
race). 
 41. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against 
Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 88–89 (2007) (―Three characteristics of the prevailing opinion 
are striking in the light of our legal history: the astonishing use of Brown in defense of an analysis that 
is utterly unlike Brown in spirit and result; the failure to confront with perception the history and 
current reality of racial segregation in the United States; and the obtuse formalism, as an array of 
technical distinctions are mobilized to avoid confronting historical reality.‖); see also Derek W. Black, 
Turning Stones of Hope into Boulders of Resistance: The First and Last Task of Social Justice 
Curriculum, Scholarship, and Practice, 86 N.C. L. REV. 673, 718–21 (2008) (criticizing the Parents 
Involved plurality opinion for disallowing any voluntary public school district efforts to address racial 
isolation in the public schools arising from de facto residential housing segregation, questioning the 
plurality‘s application of strict scrutiny review to voluntary integration programs in the public schools, 
and noting with approval and quoting Justice Kennedy‘s rejection of the Parents Involved plurality 
opinion‘s suggestion that local communities must accept ―the status quo of racial isolation in the 
schools‖); George MacInnes, Jersey Can Close the School Achievement Gap, THE STAR LEDGER, July 
9, 2007, at 15 (―Civil rights advocates assert that the decision eviscerates the spirit and letter of Brown 
v. Board of Education.‖); Editorial, Reasonable on Race, THE OKLAHOMAN, July 3, 2007, at A8 (―Last 
week‘s U.S. Supreme Court ruling against explicitly race-based school assignment programs in Seattle 
and Louisville brought howls from the political left, which reacted as if Brown v. Board of Education 
itself had been tossed into a dumpster.‖); What They Said, ST. PETERSBURG [FLORIDA] TIMES, June 
29, 2007, at A17 (quoting Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton as stating ―[t]hese decisions take away the 
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standard interpretation of the Supreme Court‘s rulings was that the 
majority had abandoned the goal of creating and maintaining racially 
integrated public schools in the United States.
42
  
My reaction to the decisions in Parents Involved and Meredith was, 
and remains, somewhat more ambivalent. Serious design flaws existed 
with respect to both affirmative action programs, particularly if defended 
solely as an exercise in diversity, rather than as designed to remediate the 
contemporary effects of past racial discrimination. Moreover, neither 
school system attempted to defend the diversity programs as remedial 
efforts at any stage of the litigation, assuming such a defense might have 
been plausible.
43
 
The Seattle program simply did not meet the requirements of a 
constitutionally permissible diversity program as set forth either in Grutter 
or Bakke.
44
 A public college or university may consider race incident to a 
comprehensive diversity program that (1) includes factors other than 
race,
45
 (2) does not give grossly disproportionate weight to race as a 
 
 
right of local communities to ensure that all students benefit from racially diverse classrooms.‖); id. 
(quoting Rev. Jesse Jackson as stating that ―[t]he premise is laid for the resegregation of America and 
the denial of opportunity‖); id. (quoting Sen. Edward Kennedy as stating ―[t]oday‘s decision turns 
back the clock on equality in our schools‖). But see James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary 
Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 149–51 (2007) (critiquing the notion that Parents Involved 
constitutes a ―betrayal‖ of Brown, especially given the prior failure to secure integrated schools 
following the Milliken decision). Indeed, supporters of the Parents Involved decision anticipated the 
strong, sustained, and negative reaction from progressives in general and the civil rights community in 
particular: 
It will be said that the very Court that led the fight for school desegregation turned history on 
its head; that the Court‘s decision served to perpetuate resegregative trends in public 
education already underway; that the Court allowed the fact of housing segregation to 
foreclose educational opportunities as well; that the Court forsook not only its traditions but 
also its respect for precedent; that a Court majority ostensibly opposed to activism was all too 
ready to practice it; and, most seriously, that the Court abandoned African Americans in their 
long struggle to achieve true equality in these United States. 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There Is No Other Way, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 158, 159 (2007). Judge Wilkinson, although supportive of the outcome and reasoning of the 
Parents Involved decision, nevertheless concedes that ―[t]he best of these arguments are not without 
poignancy and force.‖ Id. at 160. 
 42. See Black, supra note 41, at 718; Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 87–92; Ryan, supra note 41, at 
131–33, 142–44, 149–56. Whether or not the Supreme Court has ever been seriously committed to 
creating and maintaining racially integrated public schools is a matter very much open to doubt. See id. 
at 151, 153–54. 
 43. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2752 
(2007). 
 44. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324–25, 336–39, 342 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313–15 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 
2753–54. 
 45. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314–16, 334–36; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314–15 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
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diversity factor,
46
 (3) gives individualized consideration to all candidates 
for all places (i.e., does not operate either de jure or de facto as a racial 
quota),
47
 and (4) provides for institutional review of the program on a 
regular basis to ensure that race not remain a factor if it is no longer 
needed to ensure a diverse entering class.
48
 The Seattle program fell short 
of meeting these requirements in several material respects. 
To begin with, the Seattle public school district used race as the sole 
diversity factor, as the second part of a four-part tie breaker system applied 
immediately after a preference for would-be students with a sibling 
already enrolled at the school, but applied before consideration of 
geography and a last-step random selection tie-breaker.
49
 At step two, the 
only considerations in granting or denying a would-be student admission 
to a particular public high school were the student‘s race and the racial 
composition of the public high school at issue.
50
 
The policy could have truly perverse effects, from the perspective of 
enhancing a particular public school‘s student body diversity. If a high 
school had already achieved a student body with an aggregated minority 
population in excess of the targeted range, a Native American student 
would be denied admission under the second-step tie breaker, even if she 
would have been the only Native American person enrolled in the 
particular high school (i.e., the other minority students were Asian, 
Hispanic, and African American) because the district failed to make any 
effort to ascertain whether a ―critical mass‖ of particular disaggregated 
minorities existed at any particular school.
51
 How would denying 
admission to a Native American person on these facts enhance ―diversity‖ 
at the school? The clear answer is that it would not; yet because the Seattle 
public school district‘s plan amalgamated all minorities into one 
undifferentiated whole, it would not have taken into account at all whether 
a particular racial minority was represented within the student body.
52
 In 
 
 
 46. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324–25; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003); see also 
id. at 279 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 47. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334–35, 337–39; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315–17 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
 48. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (holding that ―race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in 
time‖ and suggesting that this requirement may be met ―by sunset provisions in race-conscious 
admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to 
achieve student body diversity‖). 
 49. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747. 
 50. Id. at 2753–54. 
 51. Cf. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36 (―The Law School‘s goal of attaining a critical mass of 
under-represented minority students does not transform its program into a quota.‖).  
 52. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (―It has failed to 
explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with fewer than half of the students 
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sum, serious operational problems existed with the Seattle public school 
district‘s diversity plan, even if one were to assume, counterfactually, that 
a diversity program limited to race could pass constitutional muster in the 
context of a public high school. 
Even though, as noted above, the Seattle public school district‘s 
diversity plan suffered from serious design defects, some critics of the 
Parents Involved decision have chosen simply to ignore them rather than 
engage them. One particularly prominent critic of the Parents Involved 
decision, Professor Martha Nussbaum, openly mocked Justice Kennedy‘s 
concurring opinion for seeking broad-based diversity in the assignments of 
elementary school students who are largely indistinguishable from one 
another, at least in the way that college or graduate students may differ: 
[T]here is no relevant similarity between a law school admissions 
program and a program of assigning children to primary schools. In 
the former case, the applicants are planning to live away from 
home, so the main problem in the latter case, distance between 
home and school, simply does not exist. In the former case there is a 
dossier on a candidate that contains many factors, since by the age 
of law school application the candidate has been and done many 
relevant things. Little children can have no such admissions dossier, 
from which other factors relevant to admission might be drawn. 
This all-important opinion is a cipher: it did not announce a set of 
workable criteria that might possibly substitute for the Seattle 
criteria, which Justice Kennedy rejected on utterly unclear 
grounds.
53
 
However, even if ―admissions dossiers‖ are not plausible for 
elementary school students, surely some disaggregated consideration of 
various racial and ethnic groups would be possible and, indeed, essential 
to any genuine effort to create broad-based racial and ethnic diversity 
within any public school, including even an elementary school. For 
example, even in the context of an elementary school, the district could 
include economic disadvantage as a diversity factor in addition to race 
when making student assignments. 
In other words, if easily applied criteria exist to significantly enhance 
student body diversity and use of these factors would better advance the 
district‘s interest in creating diverse elementary schools, how can a 
 
 
classified as ‗white,‘ it has employed the crude racial categories of ‗white‘ and ‗non-white‘ as the basis 
for its assignment decisions.‖); see Wilkinson, supra note 41, at 187. 
 53. Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 93. 
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reviewing court, when applying strict scrutiny, not require the school to 
adopt and implement these measures? Treating all non-white racial and 
ethnic groups as an undifferentiated, and entirely fungible, mass hardly 
reflects a serious commitment to creating racial diversity in a particular 
school; entirely ignoring economic disadvantage as a non-racial means of 
advancing diversity also suggests that the Seattle school district‘s efforts at 
promoting diversity were not designed with sufficient thought or care to 
pass the ―narrow tailoring‖ requirement of strict scrutiny. Indeed, a good 
argument exists that the Seattle program should not pass even rational 
basis review, given the extremely poor fit between the school district‘s 
stated goals and the means used to achieve these goals (i.e., the 
irrationality of denying a Native American student admission to a 
particular school based on the presence of an excess number of African 
American and Asian students). 
It also bears noting that the program at issue in Seattle applied solely to 
high school student assignments. Even if Professor Nussbaum is correct in 
theory—that seeking applications from elementary school students 
constitutes bad farce
54—this does not hold true for high school applicants. 
Some high schools offer classes in Russian; some do not. Some have 
storied band programs; others might have a state championship wrestling 
team. It is entirely plausible to believe that a would-be high school student 
with particular curricular or extracurricular interests might have a strong 
preference for a specific high school that could meet those preferences 
more effectively than another. 
Even if the differences among high schools are less pronounced than 
the differences that exist among colleges and universities, an essay 
explaining that a particular student wishes to study Russian, play the tuba 
 
 
 54. Although even this proposition is highly contestable: in cities like New York, Washington, 
D.C., and Los Angeles, it is not uncommon to have competitive application processes not only for the 
best private elementary schools, but also for kindergarten and pre-school programs. See Judith Berck, 
Before Baby Talk, Signs and Signals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at F5; Winni Hu, Where the Race Now 
Begins at Kindergarten, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at B1; Valerie Strauss, Preschool Admissions 
Process a Test for Parents Too, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1995, at B1; Amy Westfeldt, Competition 
Tough for Nursery Schools; Admission Process Zaps N.Y Parents, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 1, 
2002, at A21. Unless these application processes are simply an empty marketing gesture, it must in 
fact be possible to draw distinctions among potential students even at a very young age. That said, I 
am willing to concede the point that, for purposes of assigning thousands of students to public 
kindergartens and elementary schools in a major urban center, the use of individualized applications 
generally would not provide useful information for assigning particular students to specific schools. 
However, treating all people of color as fungible, in addition to ignoring non-racial diversity 
characteristics like socioeconomic status, disability, or coming from a household in which English is a 
second language, would represent serious design defects in diversity programs designed for public 
elementary and middle schools in a large U.S. city. 
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in the school band, or take advanced computer programming courses 
would provide useful information that could permit a public school district 
to better match students and high schools. These considerations would also 
permit a district to create diverse student bodies with respect to the range 
of interests that entering students bring to the table. Thus, if the band 
program has been undersubscribed of late, a high school admissions 
officer might give a preference to an applicant stating a strong interest in 
participating in the band. 
Other serious objections to the limited scope of the Seattle public 
school district‘s diversity plan exist and must be addressed before one 
could find the plan sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the requirements 
of the Equal Protection Clause. Of particular importance: the fact that 
many diversity characteristics beyond race are salient for high school 
students, and perhaps younger students too, especially if a public school 
system operating in a diverse urban community genuinely believes that the 
public schools have an important civic education and community building 
function. Presumably diversity in the public schools helps to forge a 
pluralistic community and civic identity, thereby facilitating the creation 
of a diverse citizenry capable of working together toward common goals, 
both in the civic sphere and also in private employment contexts. Simply 
put, for a community to thrive, people from different backgrounds and 
walks of life must be able to work effectively with each other on a 
cooperative basis. 
Accordingly, one would anticipate that an urban school district‘s 
efforts to foster cooperation across groups and subcultures within the local 
community would, of necessity, extend beyond race. But then, why did 
Seattle ignore characteristics such as an applicant‘s sexual orientation and 
gender identity? Or, for that matter, whether an applicant has same-sex 
parents? Whether an applicant‘s family uses a language other than English 
as a primary means of communication at home? Whether an applicant 
comes from a single-parent household? Whether an applicant has a 
disability? Even considering the occupational status of an applicant‘s 
parent or parents could help to create more genuinely diverse public 
schools that work to build bridges of understanding among students 
coming from very different racial, ethnic, economic, and even linguistic 
backgrounds. In particular, socioeconomic background could represent a 
very useful diversity characteristic in cities like Seattle, where 
neighborhoods vary greatly in their average household income levels.
55
 
 
 
 55. See CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY, BROOKINGS INST., SEATTLE IN FOCUS: A PROFILE 
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The point is simple, but important: in thinking about crafting a 
―diverse‖ learning environment, even in a high school, middle school, or 
elementary school, factors beyond race are highly relevant to socializing 
students for life in a highly pluralistic community like Seattle. The 
question that begs to be asked—and answered—is why the Seattle public 
schools designed a ―diversity‖ program that reduced diversity to race and 
did not even do a particularly careful job of disaggregating racial 
identities. 
In sum, Professor Nussbaum‘s observations are simply incorrect with 
respect to high school students in Seattle and, moreover, also utterly 
ignore the failure of the Louisville public school district, whose program, 
unlike Seattle‘s, encompassed elementary, middle, and high schools, to 
seek diversity among minority groups. Even if one concedes that racial 
diversity, standing alone, might be a valuable characteristic in an 
elementary school, surely the school district has an obligation to seek 
diversity in a minimally coherent fashion. And, again, it is difficult to 
understand why other important characteristics, such as disability, sexual 
orientation, same-sex parents, single-parent household, the parents‘ 
occupation, geographic origin (within the U.S. or a particular state itself), 
speaking English as a second language, and socioeconomic status, should 
not be considered in creating diverse student bodies within the public 
schools. These myriad factors appear to have been utterly ignored by the 
Seattle public school district. 
Justice O‘Connor wisely noted in Grutter that ―[b]y virtue of our 
Nation‘s struggle with racial inequality, [minority] students are both likely 
to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School‘s mission, 
and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that 
ignore those experiences.‖56 Is it at all plausible to suggest that African 
American students, Asian students, Hispanic students, and Native 
 
 
FROM CENSUS 2000 (Nov. 2003) (describing and discussing the economic and ethnic profile of 
Seattle, Washington); Dick Lilly, Op-Ed, Seattle‟s New Schools Chief Must Build on a Solid Base, 
SEATTLE TIMES, July 10, 2003, at B7, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
archive/?date=20030710 &slug=lilly10 (―we need a new superintendent who has shown the ability to 
work in a community such as ours, made up of diverse racial and socioeconomic groups, for the 
betterment of each and the advancement of all‖). An executive summary of the Brookings Institution 
report may be found at: http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2003/11_livingcities_seattle.aspx. To be 
clear, by raising the relevance of socioeconomic diversity, I do not wish to minimize or ignore the 
tremendous ethnic diversity that exists in Seattle. For example, one Seattle neighborhood, southeast 
Seattle, ―has the largest K–12 school population and the city's most diverse neighborhoods, with 
people from 73 different ethnic backgrounds living there.‖ Mickey Fearn, Editorial, Natural Wonders 
in an Urban Setting, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 16, 2006, at B7.   
 56. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. 
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American students are entirely fungible with respect to their cultural and 
social experiences or in the ways discrimination or prejudice manifests 
itself in their life experiences? How can a school district reasonably assert 
a compelling interest in diversity when it fails to take the diversity of 
experiences among people of color seriously? To essentialize all people of 
color into a single ―non-white‖ category utterly betrays the very interest in 
diversity that the Seattle public schools claimed in justification of its 
program.
57
 That the district also rejected as relevant the existence of 
persons self-identifying as multiracial also undermines the district‘s claim 
to be engaged in a serious effort to promote racial diversity within its 
schools.
58
 
A very similar design flaw also existed with respect to Jefferson 
County, Kentucky, school district‘s diversity plan at issue in Meredith. 
The Louisville public schools defined race in bipolar terms, measuring 
solely the percentage of each schools‘ student body that was ―Black‖ or 
―Other.‖59 The district made no effort to ascertain the enrollment numbers 
of other minorities within the community, including Hispanic, Asian, and 
Native American students, instead amalgamating all of them with white 
students for purposes of analyzing a particular school‘s progress in 
achieving racial diversity.
60
 Such an approach might have worked as part 
of a remedial plan, based on the district‘s prior history of discrimination 
against African Americans and not Hispanics, Asians, or Native 
 
 
 57. Not only did the Seattle public schools create a binary white/non-white ethnic universe, but 
school personnel also engaged in very troubling exercises in racial classification when a parent refused 
to indicate a racial identity. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754 n.11 (―Upon enrolling their child 
with the district, parents are required to identify their child as a member of a particular racial group. If 
a parent identifies more than one race on the form, ‗[t]he application will not be accepted and, if 
necessary, the enrollment service person taking the application will indicate one box.‘‖). 
 58. See id.; see also Sharon Jayson, Racial Identity: Not a Black-and-White Issue, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 9, 2008, at D5 (noting the increasing self-identification of people from different ethnic 
backgrounds as ―multiracial‖ and reporting on an academic study finding that ―[t]here is much less 
‗agreement‘ about what race a person is than is commonly thought‖). In fact, empirical data collected 
in California and Oregon ―show change over time in racial self-identification and in the way people 
perceive the racial identity of others.‖ Id. Professor Ann Morning, a sociologist at New York 
University, predicts that President Obama ―may become a role model for those who identify as black 
and those who say they are multiracial.‖ Id. In fact, the Department of Education has adopted new 
regulations that will require local public school districts to permit the families of enrolled students to 
self-identify as multiracial. Michael Alison Chandler & Maria Glod, Multiracial Students to Be 
Counted in New Manner, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 26, 2009, at D22 (―Public 
schools are abandoning their check-one-box approach to gathering information about race and 
ethnicity in an effort to develop a more accurate portrait of classrooms transformed by immigration 
and interracial marriage.‖). The new rules will take effect in 2010. Id. 
 59. See 127 S. Ct. at 2754. 
 60. Id. 
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Americans, but the district defended the plan solely on diversity grounds.
61
 
Surely ―diversity,‖ even if defined solely in terms of race, must 
incorporate minorities other than African Americans. 
Moreover, to merge non-African American racial minorities with 
whites for purposes of analyzing the success of the program borders on the 
Kafkaesque, at least if one assumes that the Louisville school district 
genuinely sought to enhance the racial diversity of each school within the 
district. Even assuming for the moment that limiting a diversity program 
to race would be permissible in the first instance, how would excluding 
Asian, Hispanic, or Native American children from a public school 
because of the presence of a large number of white students rationally 
advance a coherent notion of racial diversity? Even if Louisville‘s efforts 
at racial subordination were principally targeted at African Americans, the 
experience of other people of color in the United States has not been an 
entirely happy one (not to put too fine a point on the matter). To deny 
admission to students of color who wished to attend a particular public 
school because the district deemed the white enrollment to be too high 
simply boggles the mind. Yet, this is precisely how the Louisville program 
operated. 
One might concede the utility of a binary ―white‖/―black‖ dichotomy, 
however, if the purpose of the program was not related to diversity, but 
rather to remediation. Certainly such a binary world would be defensible 
in a community in which discrimination against one group (blacks) and in 
favor of another (whites) was the most salient characteristic of public 
school assignment policy for generations. It would be perfectly sensible to 
inquire into whether backsliding, in the form of discrimination against 
African American students and in favor of white students, had crept back 
into the school system, whether by design or through default and path 
dependence. 
In light of these serious deficiencies in the designs of both diversity 
programs, the Supreme Court decided both cases correctly on the facts and 
arguments presented at bar. Even so, the Louisville case arguably should 
have been decided differently on the facts presented had the district 
defended its program on remedial grounds.
62
 
 
 
 61. Id. at 2752. 
 62. A remedy for proven discrimination against African American students could require 
providing targeted benefits to African American children, but not to other minority children. See 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166–71 (1987) (plurality opinion). In Paradise, the Supreme 
Court affirmed a remedial order that required the Alabama Department of Public Safety to hire one 
African American for every other open position, until the department‘s personnel achieved an overall 
25% African American work force and to undertake a similar one-for-one approach to promotions for 
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II. DIVERSITY: A BROAD BUT SHALLOW JUSTIFICATION FOR RACE-
CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENT ACTION 
Both the Seattle and Louisville public schools invoked ―diversity,‖ 
rather than ―remediation,‖ to support their racial preferences in assigning 
students to particular public schools. This is not surprising because, as 
Professor Schuck notes, ―most discussions of diversity and the diversity 
rationale for affirmative action do not explain what it actually means, 
much less which groups with what kinds of attributes create diversity-
value.‖63  
What precisely is ―diversity‖ and when may government invoke it to 
defend a race-conscious program? Professor Sanford Levinson notes that 
diversity ―has become the favorite catchword—indeed it would not be an 
exaggeration to say ‗mantra‘—of those defending the use of racial or 
ethnic preferences.‖64 Moreover, this trend undoubtedly reflects the 
Supreme Court‘s own embrace of this nomenclature: ―if Simon says, ‗Start 
talking about diversity—and downplay any talk about rectification of past 
social injustice,‘ then the conversation proceeds exactly in that 
direction.‖65 This Part first considers the theoretical and doctrinal bases for 
permitting race-conscious government action to promote diversity. It then 
examines the difficulty that courts, government officials, and legal 
academics have experienced in using the concept in a consistent and 
coherent fashion. 
A. The Doctrinal Contours of Diversity as a Compelling Justification for 
Race-Conscious Government Action 
Using Grutter and Bakke as guides, one can infer that diversity counts 
as a compelling interest only in circumstances where government can 
plausibly argue that racial diversity somehow contributes to the success of 
 
 
senior management positions until the department reached an identical 25% threshold. Id. at 160–66, 
185–86. Thus, this order had the necessary effect of precluding the department from hiring a member 
of another racial minority (say an Asian person) for every other spot; in other words, the remedy had 
the effect of classifying all applicants as ―black‖ and ―other,‖ just like the Jefferson County public 
schools‘ student assignment program. If a targeted remedy for past discrimination can single out a 
specific minority group for preferred treatment, the necessary implication is the creation of a binary 
world in which the government entity must classify all applicants (or students) as falling within or 
outside the group benefitted by the remedial order. From this perspective, the Jefferson County public 
schools properly adopted a binary ―black‖/―other‖ system of monitoring student assignments. 
 63. Schuck, supra note 6, at 37. 
 64. Levinson, supra note 27, at 577. 
 65. Id. at 578. 
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the government‘s project.66 A diverse college or university student body 
enhances the quality of the program; so would a diverse college or 
university faculty. By parity of logic, diversity should also extend to high 
school student bodies, faculties, and administration. Of course, the 
Supreme Court rejected a role model theory in Wygant v. Jackson Board 
of Education,
67
 but the diversity argument seems easily distinguishable 
from the role model theory that the Jackson, Michigan, public school 
district advanced in Wygant. Racial and ethnic diversity enhance the 
effectiveness of the educational process and also its success at socializing 
students for life in a pluralistic society.
68
 
Other areas in which racial diversity might plausibly relate to the 
quality of the government‘s results include a police force, a prison work 
force, and the staffing of ―scared straight‖ programs aimed at redirecting 
the trajectories of troubled youths.
69
 As Professor Michelle Adams has 
 
 
 66. See id. at 586 (noting that corporate defenders of racial diversity in the workforce suggest 
that it conveys a competitive advantage). Levinson notes that defining advantage in this context 
requires asking ―can it plausibly be said that a diverse workforce will produce a better-tasting product 
or that it will even produce the same product in a better manner, e.g., more efficiently?‖ Id. He posits 
that ―[i]t is obvious how the answer might be affirmative.‖ Id. 
 67. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274–76 (1986). Local school 
administrators in Jackson, Michigan, adopted racial preferences in hiring, staffing, and firing teachers 
within the school district. Id. at 272. The board adopted these policies on the theory that minority 
students suffered diminished educational results because of the pernicious effects of general societal 
discrimination and that these negative effects could be successfully addressed by the presence of 
positive professional role models of the minority students‘ race or ethnicity. Id. Both the district court 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit accepted this argument, holding that ―the Board‘s 
interest in providing minority role models for its minority students, as an attempt to alleviate the 
effects of societal discrimination, was sufficiently important to justify the racial classification 
embodied in the layoff provision.‖ Id. at 274. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed. Justice 
Powell, writing for the plurality, squarely rejected this approach as inconsistent with the central 
mandate of the Equal Protection Clause: ―The role model theory allows the Board to engage in 
discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate remedial 
purpose.‖ Id. at 275; see also id. at 274 (noting that the ―Court never has held that societal 
discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification‖ and emphasizing that ―the Court has 
insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing 
limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination‖). For a thoughtful and 
comprehensive critique of the Supreme Court‘s rejection of the role model theory in this context, while 
endorsing it in others, see Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1377, 1431–58 (1996). 
 68. Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things up to Their First Principles: Reflections on the Values 
of Affirmative Action, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1323–35 (1999) (arguing that social science data 
generally support the claim that diversity within a student body and faculty enhances the quality of 
education). 
 69. See Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 2007); Petit v. City of 
Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (7th Cir. 2003) (police force); Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919–
20 (7th Cir. 1996) (boot camp correctional officers); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 
601–02 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (―The public interest in broadcast diversity—like the interest 
in an integrated police force, diversity in the composition of a public school faculty or diversity in the 
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noted, ―[t]he operational needs argument connects the ability of the public 
employer to perform its public function directly to the presence of a 
racially diverse workforce.‖70 For example, if achieving the remedial 
purposes of a boot camp program required taking gender and race into 
account in making staff selections and assignments, it is likely that a 
reviewing court would sustain the government‘s race-conscious action as 
being essential to the attainment of a compelling government interest (i.e., 
the non-recidivism of the youths being ―scared straight‖). 
It is easy to hypothesize other circumstances in which a true diversity 
motive related to operational imperatives would target race as a factor in 
hiring and assignments.
71
 If the FBI were investigating ―La Cosa Nostra,‖ 
commonly known as ―the mafia‖ or ―the mob,‖ assigning an African 
American or Asian agent to infiltrate the group might not be the most 
effective approach—just as assigning a white agent to infiltrate a Tong or 
Triad (Chinese organized crime groups) suspected of engaging in unlawful 
activity would likely meet with poor results.
72
 In such a case, the hiring or 
assignment to a specific investigation of an agent with particular racial, 
ethnic, or cultural ties would be essential to the successful attainment of 
the government‘s objective. No remedial rationale exists for the posting; 
the government seeks a white agent in one case and an Asian, perhaps 
Chinese, agent in the other solely because the nature of the task at hand 
requires it and no less race-conscious means exist to achieve the 
government‘s interest in criminal law investigation and enforcement.73 
 
 
student body of a professional school—is in my view unquestionably legitimate.‖); McNamara v. City 
of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998) (―[T]his court has held that at least in the area of 
policing and corrections it is possible to justify nonremedial affirmative action upon a showing—
which must however be based on evidence rather than merely on conjecture—that such action is 
necessary to the accomplishment of important law-enforcement objectives‖). 
 70. Adams, supra note 17, at 966.  
 71. But cf. Levinson, supra note 27, at 590–91 (noting that ―there is a debate about the relevance 
of diverse backgrounds to the quality of what is produced,‖ both in government and corporate settings, 
and citing and quoting relevant social science literature). Obviously, the relevance of diversity to a 
particular task is very likely to be context specific; in other words, one cannot ask, in general, does 
diversity improve the quality of products or services, but rather one must ask if a diverse workforce, 
whether in a public or private setting, improves this product or service. See id. at 584–89. 
 72. For a description and discussion of various organized crime entities with ethnic or racial 
identities operating in the United States, see PRESIDENT‘S COMM‘N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE 
IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 33–128 (1986). 
 73. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314–15 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that, in some contexts, achievement of plainly legitimate government interests requires 
consideration of race and gender in both hiring and making work assignments); see also Adams, supra 
note 17, at 965–67 (discussing the ―operational needs‖ theory of diversity-based race-conscious 
government action and the contexts in which it could apply). 
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Thus, at a broader level of analysis, it seems clear that an effective law 
enforcement agency must be composed of a diverse group of officers if it 
is to effectively discharge its institutional mission. In this specific context, 
a racially and ethnically diverse government work force is simply a better, 
more effective work force than a homogeneous work force.
74
 And, again, 
the government‘s motivation for seeking out a racially and ethnically 
diverse law enforcement agency has nothing to do with concerns rooted in 
racial justice or the amelioration of the present-day effects of past 
government racial discrimination. 
The same considerations would apply in hiring and staffing a prison, a 
TSA check point, a police department, a department of social services, and 
even a hospital or emergency response team. Suppose that a community 
has a large presence of Hmong immigrants; recruiting and retaining 
persons capable of speaking Hmong Der or Mong Leng, the two main 
dialects of Hmong language, might be important, even crucial to various 
public health and safety functions.
75
 If a person calls 911 seeking 
assistance, the dispatcher‘s fluency in an ethnic community‘s language 
could be essential to fielding the call and dispatching assistance in a timely 
manner. Similarly, if one is investigating reports of parental neglect of a 
child, the investigator‘s familiarity with the household‘s culture and 
relevant language skills could be necessary to the successful investigation 
and resolution of complaints. 
Certainly a police department, hospital, or department of social 
services could attempt to find a non-Hmong person who speaks Hmong 
Der or Mong Leng and also understands Hmong cultural norms and 
etiquette; even so, the fit between membership within the group and the 
necessary ethnic and cultural traits is quite strong and it would be at least 
arguable that a preference for a person from the Hmong community would 
be a narrowly tailored means of advancing the government‘s interests in 
providing vital social services. In these circumstances, the government‘s 
 
 
 74. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314–15 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that certain 
government services will function more effectively with a racially and ethnically diverse staff); Petit, 
352 F.3d at 1115 (accepting an operational needs justification for considering race in making 
promotions with a city‘s police department); see also Michael K. Fridkin, The Permissibility of Non-
Remedial Justifications for Racial Preferences in Public Contracting, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 509, 515 
(2004) (―Besides diversity, a frequent candidate for consideration as a non-remedial justification for 
racial preferences is an agency‘s ‗operational needs.‘‖); Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of 
Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 
677, 693–700 (2004) (discussing ―instrumental‖ justifications for race-conscious government hiring 
and promotion decisions and reviewing relevant courts of appeals decisions sustaining such action). 
 75. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―race is not always irrelevant to sound 
governmental decisionmaking‖). 
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interest in adopting a Hmong preference has no remedial basis at all; the 
government seeks to achieve certain goals, namely the provision of certain 
services and enforcement of certain rules and regulations, and a 
government entity can meet these objectives with greater efficacy if it 
employs persons hailing from the Hmong community.
76
 
These considerations led Justice Stevens, in Wygant, to observe that 
race and gender can be highly relevant to achieving wholly legitimate 
government purposes, including ―law enforcement‖ objectives. Justice 
Stevens explains that, ―in a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the 
superintendent of police might reasonably conclude that an integrated 
police force could develop a better relationship with the community and 
thereby do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a force 
composed only of white officers.‖77 He extends this reasoning to include 
racial hiring preferences for public schools, the policy at issue in Wygant.
78
 
Concerns of this sort strike both liberal and conservative judges as 
sensible. Chief Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit authored an opinion upholding the use of racial hiring 
preferences for a state correctional boot camp because of the importance 
of an integrated corrections staff to maintaining order, ensuring the safety 
of the incarcerated persons held at the facility, and preventing participants 
from becoming recidivists.
79
 
In contexts such as higher education or the military, one can certainly 
mount a strong case that diversity bears a significant relationship to the 
quality of the government‘s program or the program‘s efficacy in 
advancing the government‘s objectives.80 In other words, in both of these 
contexts, and in others like them, a strong argument can be made that 
 
 
 76. See Adams, supra note 17, at 965–67. 
 77. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 78. See id. at 315 (―In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that a school board may 
reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body that 
could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty.‖). 
 79. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has strongly endorsed ―the compelling nature of the state‘s interest in diversity in law 
enforcement.‖ Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Petit v. 
City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003); Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 
529–31 (7th Cir. 2002).  
 80. See Killenbeck, supra note 68, at 1323–35 (surveying social science evidence supporting a 
link between diverse learning environments in colleges and universities and improved educational 
outcomes and concluding that the link is a very plausible one); see Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as 
Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale in Military Affirmative Action, 113 YALE L.J. 
1093, 1114–23 (2004) (arguing that military forces have to maintain credibility with local populations 
on a global basis and that a diverse population of military service persons directly advances and 
secures this government interest and also observing that diversity can enhance performance in other 
contexts, and also increase the ability of the military to recruit volunteers successfully). 
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racial diversity makes the government‘s end product better than it would 
be absent the diversity consideration. As one moves from contexts where 
the adoption of the racial hiring preference or assignment policy bears a 
direct and obvious connection to the successful attainment of the 
government‘s objectives to situations in which the link to diversity is more 
attenuated, the viability of diversity as a rationale for race-conscious 
government action becomes more questionable. Indeed, many contexts 
exist in which such a showing would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
make. 
Consider, for example, the construction of streets and highways. There 
might be symbolic importance to having a racially or gender integrated 
workforce in government-sponsored road construction; even so, the road 
surface itself does not reflect either the race or the gender of the persons 
who built it.
81
 If a government entity wishes to adopt race or gender 
preferences in this context, the diversity rationale provides little, if any, 
justification or support.
82
 Thus, the diversity rationale provides an 
important, but limited, basis for the adoption of race-conscious 
government action.  
In all of this, one should take care to note that diversity does not have 
the effect of validating private bias in most contexts, for example, in 
college and university admissions; instead, it simply recognizes both the 
fact of cultural difference and its salience to achieving a particular 
constitutionally permissible government objective.
83
 Thus, unlike the state 
of Florida‘s use of race in Palmore v. Sidoti to deny a custodial biological 
mother continued custody of her daughter because of the mother‘s 
interracial marriage to an African American man,
84
 the use of diversity to 
create a racially and ethnically diverse student body does not ―directly or 
indirectly‖ validate or give effect to ―private biases.‖85 On the other hand, 
the use of diversity in other contexts, such as in hiring staff for a police 
department or prison or in recruiting for the military, could arguably have 
 
 
 81. See Levinson, supra note 27, at 587 (―[I]f a non-discriminatory process generates a non-
diverse workforce, for whatever reason, it may still be the case that the particular product is the best it 
can be, and being produced as efficiently as it could be.‖). 
 82. Cf. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641–42 (1987) (permitting affirmative action 
based on gender to remediate past gender-based discrimination by the agency). 
 83. Cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1984) (holding that ―[t]he effects of racial 
prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody 
of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody‖ because to permit 
government action on this basis would ratify private racial bias and imbue its status with the full 
authority of the government). 
 84. See id. at 430–31. 
 85. See id. at 433. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
934 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:907 
 
 
 
 
the effect of ratifying preexisting social prejudice because the interest in 
racial and ethnic diversity arises, at least in part, from mistrust and bias 
that reflect part of the social reality of the contemporary United States. 
In theory, Palmore holds that ―[p]rivate biases may be outside the 
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them 
effect.‖86 Yet, in decisions such as Wittmer v. Peters87 and Petit v. City of 
Chicago,
88
 the lower federal courts have accepted the fact of racial 
prejudice in society and upheld government efforts to create diverse law 
enforcement workforces that can function effectively notwithstanding 
these prejudices. To the extent that diversity efforts take race into account 
in circumstances where private prejudice creates an incentive to hire 
government employees or to assign government employees by race, the 
practice would seem to run afoul of Palmore‘s central holding. 
The best response one can make to this ironic circumstance would be to 
note that the same compelling interest that justifies the use of race in a 
diversity program would also, at least potentially, justify a derogation 
from Palmore‘s mandate to achieve an overriding government interest 
such as providing a safe prison, or effectively policing all neighborhoods 
in a major urban center, or effectively discharging the duties of a social 
welfare services office. In this sense, then, the diversity rationale rests 
uncomfortably up against the core purpose of the equal protection 
principle, for at least in some circumstances, the government‘s interest in 
promoting diversity will have the perverse effect of ratifying and perhaps 
helping to maintain, at least at the margins, preexisting private racial bias. 
Another possible response to a potential Palmore objection relates to 
the synergies that a diverse workforce can provide. Social science data 
suggest that a diverse workforce can be a more effective workforce, at 
least in some contexts.
89
 A government entity could adopt a diversity plan 
 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919–21 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 88. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114–15, 1118 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 89. See Levinson, supra note 27, at 586; see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE 
SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND 
UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 220–40 (1998); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse 
Society: Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
49, 63 (1998) (―Proponents of racial diversity argue that, in many contexts, an employer‘s ability to 
accomplish its goals is enhanced by a diverse work force. Racial and ethnic diversity is often viewed 
as a proxy for diversity of opinions, experiences, and beliefs. In an otherwise overwhelmingly white 
work force, minority employees introduce valuable differences into a setting of comparative 
homogeneity.‖); Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 723–25 (1999) 
(reviewing WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998) (noting 
that college and university students self-report significant benefits from learing in a racially diverse 
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because of these synergies; different people working together are simply 
better able to tackle problems than a homogeneous group because they see 
common problems in different ways. Thus, even if adoption of a diversity 
program generates an ancillary benefit that derives in part from the 
prejudices of society, this might well not be the government‘s primary 
motivation for adopting the diversity program.
90
 
If diversity is generally a good thing and, in any case, often 
demonstrably correlates positively to enhanced results, there should not be 
any need to sunset diversity programs. Dean Caminker and Professor 
Amar note, ―Diversity, unlike remedy, is a justification that is not 
temporally linked to past events; whereas remedy looks to the past, 
diversity looks to the educational benefits today and in the future.‖91 In 
this sense, Justice O‘Connor‘s insistence in Grutter that diversity 
programs in college and university admissions must be reviewed regularly 
and should end in twenty-five years
92
 makes very little sense. Does anyone 
 
 
environment, notably including the ability to ―‗get[ ] along with others‘ from diverse backgrounds,‖ 
and also contributes significantly to the students‘ ―ability to work with others‖ in later life); id. at 730 
(―According to the study, having a diverse student body helps students—all students—prepare to live 
in a diverse world; it introduces them to people they may not have met otherwise until later in life, if at 
all, and it clearly helps them work with others during their careers.‖). But cf. Schuck, supra note 6, at 
43–46 (―After carefully interrogating the diversity rationale for racial preferences, then, one is left with 
serious doubts about its coherence and persuasiveness. There is something to it, surely, but not 
much.‖). Professor Selmi, drawing on lessons contained in a large scale study of college and university 
students‘ self-perception of the costs and benefits of affirmative action both while in school and when 
employed in later life, concludes that ―the greatest contribution the study makes [to the literature on 
the potential value of diversity] is a rather definitive demonstration that affirmative action works, and 
that it works on all the various dimensions that the authors suggest an educational policy should 
work.‖ Id. at 726.  
 90. As an analogy, people invest in individual retirement accounts because of the tax savings, but 
they also invest because they believe that saving money constitutes a prudent personal financial course 
of conduct. It is not clear that the tax savings, rather than the motive to save more generally, is the 
cause in fact of a particular contribution. By parity of reasoning, obtaining the benefits associated with 
a heterogeneous workforce could easily be the cause in fact for a government agency adopting a 
particular diversity program. 
 91. Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice O‟Connor‟s 
Closing Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 543 (2003); see Kenneth L. Karst, The 
Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 69–71 (2004) (arguing that 
the forward-looking benefits associated with an integrated society, rather than remediation of past 
racial wrongs, undergirds Grutter‘s theory of affirmative action); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, 
Sins of Discrimination: Last Term‟s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 91–96 (1986) 
(arguing against affirmative action policies predicated on past government discrimination, which 
Sullivan terms the ―sins of discrimination‖ approach, because such remedial policies are likely to be 
more difficult to establish, underemphasize collective social responsibility for past discriminatory 
policies, are subject to sharp criticism for insufficient tailoring, ―keep[ ] alive protests about windfalls 
to nonvictims and injustice to innocents,‖ and generally prove to be less effective than forward-looking 
policies based on the relationship of diversity and pluralism to a just and well-functioning society, 
which Sullivan denominates an ―aspirations for the future‖ approach). 
 92. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003). 
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think that learning in an all-white, all-male college or university will ever 
be superior to learning in a comprehensively integrated environment? 
Moreover, just as people continue to celebrate Cinco de Mayo, St. 
Patrick‘s Day, and Columbus Day, and just as the U.S. Postal Service 
produces postage stamps celebrating Eid, Hanukkah, Christmas, and 
Kwanza for the use of persons who identify with and celebrate these 
holidays, there is no reason to think that race, ethnicity, national identity, 
religion, gender, sexual orientation or other longstanding self-definitional 
traits (whether immutable, like race, or self-selected, like religion) will 
cease to have all relevance in 2028. Thus, I do not think that the Ancient 
Order of Hibernians
93
 should feel ambivalent about its existence after 2028 
or consider seriously disbanding in order to facilitate the realization of the 
melting pot metaphor. Why then the 2028 sunset requirement in Grutter?
94
 
If one viewed the law school‘s program in Grutter, at least with respect 
to race, as either remedial in nature or as a dual effort at both diversity and 
remediation, a sunset requirement would make perfect sense. After all, 
once a governmental entity has remediated the present effects of past 
discrimination, there would be no need for further remedial efforts. What 
we see, then, is that the Supreme Court itself tends to revert into a 
remedial mindset even when, in theory, discussing a diversity program.
95
 
We should expect that at some discrete time in the future efforts to 
remediate past discrimination, unlike diversity programs, will have some 
natural stopping point: when the contemporary effects of the past 
discrimination have been completely negated, when the contemporary 
effects of the past discrimination are so attenuated that nothing is left to 
 
 
 93. The Ancient Order of Hibernians is an Irish-American fraternal organization; members must 
be male, belong to the Roman Catholic Church, and have Irish ancestry. See N.Y. County Bd. of 
Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358, 360–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Katrina 
Dix, When Everyone‟s Irish, THE DAILY LOCAL (West Chester, Pa.), Mar. 15, 2010, available at 
http://www.dailylocal.com/articles/2010/03/15/news/srv0000007820958.txt. Among other activities, 
local chapters of the Ancient Order of Hibernians commonly sponsor parades celebrating St. Patrick‘s 
Day. 
 94. Amar & Caminker, supra note 91, at 543–44 (―If diversity (including but not limited to racial 
diversity) truly is a compelling interest—and Justice O‘Connor spends a lot of time in Grutter 
explaining that it is—and if individualistic race consciousness is in fact a constitutionally 
unproblematic way to accomplish this interest consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, then there 
should be no ‗requirement‘ that the permissible means not be employed indefinitely.‖). 
 95. This point relates to a major criticism of the modern Supreme Court‘s embrace of ―diversity‖ 
rather than ―remediation‖ as the most constitutionally defensible governmental interest for race-
conscious admissions policies. As Professor Michelle Adams has observed, ―one of the more 
devastating criticisms leveled against Grutter (and against Bakke before it) concerns the adoption of 
‗diversity‘ as the principal justification for affirmative action, as opposed to a candid recognition of 
present racial inequality and the continuing effects of past discrimination.‖ Michelle Adams, Radical 
Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261, 285 (2006). 
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remediate, or some combination of the two. On the other hand, diversity 
programs should in theory be relevant so long as we believe that pluralism 
is relevant to the excellence and success of the government program at 
issue.
96
 
B. The Difficulty in Defining “Diversity” 
Even though it is relatively easy to define ―diversity‖ in a fashion that 
disentangles the concept from ―remediation,‖ the wires get crossed with 
great regularity in both legal scholarship and the decisions of the Supreme 
Court.
97
 As Professor Levinson has aptly noted, ―‗diversity‘ is one of those 
words, like ‗equality,‘ ‗democracy,‘ and ‗freedom,‘ whose meaning, if not 
entirely a construct of the speaker, is, nonetheless, significantly 
ambiguous.‖98 
For example, Professor Lani Guinier writes of the Grutter majority 
opinion that ―[n]ow, with the Court‘s imprimatur on affirmative action, 
perhaps those who still feel excluded will return the conversation to more 
foundational concerns about the democratic purpose of higher 
education.‖99 Of course, Justice O‘Connor‘s Grutter opinion almost 
completely abjures the phrase ―affirmative action‖;100 instead Justice 
O‘Connor assiduously hews to the law school‘s self-selected nomenclature 
of ―diversity‖ to describe the institution‘s efforts to admit and enroll not 
only a racially diverse class, but also a diverse class in other respects.
101
 In 
fact, Justice O‘Connor places great weight on the fact that under the law 
school‘s diversity program, the University of Michigan Law School 
 
 
 96. See Amar & Caminker, supra note 91, at 543–44. 
 97. See supra text and accompanying notes 5–21. 
 98. Levinson, supra note 27, at 608; see also Jones, supra note 18, at 176 (―Diversity lacks a 
substantive, clearly defined meaning in contemporary parlance. The concept means different things to 
different people depending upon when, where, and by whom it is invoked.‖). 
 99. Guinier, supra note 22, at 120. 
 100. The main text of the Grutter opinion contains only a single use of the words ―affirmative 
action.‖ See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (―We first wish to dispel the notion that the 
Law School's argument has been foreclosed, either expressly or implicitly, by our affirmative-action 
cases decided since Bakke.‖). The words ―affirmative action‖ appear only one additional time in the 
Grutter majority opinion—in a citation to a book. See id. at 330 (―Diversity Challenged: Evidence on 
the Impact of Affirmative Action (G. Orfield & M. Kurlaender eds., 2001)‖). ―Diversity,‖ by way of 
contrast, appears 52 times in the opinion (including one citation to a book, id. at 330). Id. at 314–16, 
319, 321–22, 324–26, 328–30, 333–35, 337–43. Thus, contrary to Professor Guinier‘s assertion, 
Justice O‘Connor simply did not use the phrase ―affirmative action‖ as a synonym for ―diversity‖ in 
the Grutter majority opinion. Given the fifty-two to two ratio of use within Grutter, it seems very clear 
that Justice O‘Connor intentionally embraced the more precise nomenclature of ―diversity‖ over the 
more generic ―affirmative action.‖  
 101. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337–39, 341. 
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offered admission to non-minorities with lower LSAT scores and 
undergraduate grade point averages than those of the minority students 
who had been offered admission incident to the law school‘s diversity 
program.
102
 She writes, ―The Law School does not, however, limit in any 
way the broad range of qualities and experiences that may be considered 
valuable contributions to student body diversity.‖103 
It would be unfair, however, to single out Professor Guinier for 
criticism based on lack of precision in her use of nomenclature.
104
 Myriad 
commentators have used the term ―diversity‖ as a generic synonym for 
remedial affirmative action efforts, without making much, if any, effort to 
distinguish diversity and remedial justifications for benign race-conscious 
government action.
105
 For example, Professor Douglas Laycock flatly 
declares that ―‗[d]iversity‘ is the settled judicial rationale for affirmative 
action, and the diversity label has the great value of applying throughout 
the country.‖106 
Professor Alan Dershowitz argues that ―[t]he checkered history of 
‗diversity‘ demonstrates that it was designed largely as a cover to achieve 
other legally, morally, and politically controversial goals,‖ and, in 
particular, is ―a clever post facto justification for increasing the number of 
minority group students in the student body.‖107 This, however, is not the 
 
 
 102. Id. at 338 (―The Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test 
scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are 
rejected. This shows that the Law School seriously weighs many other diversity factors besides race 
that can make a real and dispositive difference for nonminority applicants as well.‖) (citation omitted). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See generally Levinson, supra note 27, at 608 (―‗[D]iversity‘ as a general notion is thought to 
be a ‗good thing,‘ though, concomitantly, someone who doesn‘t share one‘s own views about the 
concrete meaning of this good is often subject to dismissive contempt.‖). 
 105. See Rosman, supra note 20, at 63 n.72 (collecting and quoting various sources that take note 
of, and object to, this phenomenon). 
 106. Laycock, supra note 22, at 1769. In fairness, Professor Laycock also observes that ―scholarly 
analysis and political argument are not confined to the rationales adopted judicially‖ and that the 
Grutter opinion ―should not cause policy makers to lose sight of other powerful reasons for affirmative 
action, or of affirmative action‘s special value in the South.‖ Id. Of course, Professor Laycock‘s 
approach conflates ―diversity‖ with ―affirmative action,‖ which, given the context he raises, ―the 
South,‖ strongly suggests that he embraces a remedial function for ostensibly diversity based 
affirmative action programs. Moreover, substantial portions of his article and analysis, see id. at 1776–
89 (discussing litigation to desegregate the public schools and universities in the South and the 
remedial decrees issued in these cases), seems to conflate diversity, affirmative action, and remedial 
race-conscious government actions. For example, Laycock faults the Grutter Court because ―it did not 
cite Fordice, and it made no explicit connection to the law of desegregation.‖ Id. at 1792. Given that 
the University of Michigan Law School never made any attempt to defend its programs on a remedial 
basis, however, it should not be at all surprising that Justice O‘Connor did not rely on precedents 
arising in the remedial context, rather than in the context of promoting diversity as a permissible 
government objective. 
 107. Dershowitz & Hanft, supra note 22, at 407. 
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―diversity‖ that Justice Powell had in mind in Bakke. As Judge Harry 
Edwards notes, ―It is plausible to view racial equality as only incidental to 
Justice Powell‘s idea of diversity, for he did explicitly note that diversity 
embraced more than race and ethnicity.‖108 And the Grutter Court itself 
invited a remedial understanding of diversity because ―Grutter, unlike 
Bakke, suggests a link between diversity and the ongoing quest for racial 
equality.‖109 Thus, Judge Edwards, like Professor Guinier, can reasonably 
conclude that ―it is highly plausible that Grutter uses diversity as a proxy 
for redress against past racial discrimination.‖110 As Professor Trina Jones 
 
 
 108. Edwards, supra note 36, at 963; see also Laycock, supra note 22, at 1770 (―For Justice 
Powell, diversity meant diversity of background and experience within the classroom, for the purpose 
of improving the educational experience in that classroom.‖). Professor Brown-Nagin criticizes this 
iteration of ―diversity‖ precisely because, in both design and effect, it actually benefits non-minorities 
more than minorities: 
The predominant line of reasoning running through the Michigan opinion remained that 
affirmative action furthers the interests of whites as a group, even if such programs 
sometimes deny individual whites access to certain selective institutions of higher education. 
In other words, the interests of the majority converged with the interests of the minority, and 
it is this convergence that justified programs that otherwise would be deemed unlawful.  
 . . . The question of whether slavery and Jim Crow justified race-sensitive admissions 
was deemphasized in the Court‘s embrace of the diversity rationale. 
Brown-Nagin, supra note 18, at 1484–85; see also Nunn, supra note 21, at 724 (―Apparently, the 
reason the Supreme Court found a compelling state interest in Grutter was that people of color could 
be used as a means to white ends. . . .‖ ―Thus, although the Supreme Court has demonstrated why 
diversity might be good for white people, it fails to speak to why diversity might be good for people of 
color.‖). 
 109. Edwards, supra note 36, at 965; see also Laycock, supra note 22, at 1773–74 (―The label, 
‗diversity,‘ is the same [as in Bakke], and retaining that label had rhetorical advantages for the Court, 
but the meaning has fundamentally changed.‖). 
 110. Edwards, supra note 36, at 967; see also Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61–65 (2003). But cf. Karst, supra note 
91, at 69 (―The goal articulated in Grutter—integrating the leadership of major American 
institutions—does not look back to catalogue all the multifold harms of slavery and Jim Crow, and 
offer a remedy. Rather, the opinion places us in the Here and Now, and looks to our national future.‖). 
Professor Karst suggests that Justice O‘Connor was more concerned with the future benefits of an 
integrated society (and leadership caste) than with addressing the contemporary effects of past racial 
discrimination: ―In this way, integration promises not the erasure of harms from past racial exclusions, 
but the avoidance of future racial exclusions, and the harms they would surely bring.‖ Id. at 71; see 
Robert S. Chang & Catherine E. Smith, John Calmore‟s America, 86 N.C. L. REV. 739, 755 (2008) 
(―[D]iversity, though providing a constitutional basis for affirmative action, can also be a trap for this 
very reason‖ because ―[s]chools, rather than engaging in . . . research and documentation [to support a 
remedial predicate for a race-conscious affirmative action plan], which would be expensive to 
document and which would call for a guilty plea of sorts to the charge of racism, will instead opt for 
the diversity rationale as the constitutional basis for the race-conscious plans.‖); Sullivan, supra note 
91, at 92, 96 (arguing that ―[m]aking sins of past discrimination the justification for affirmative action 
. . . dooms affirmative action to further challenge even while legitimating it‖ and arguing that instead 
governments should embrace ―aspirations for the future rather than past sin‖ as the basis for race-
conscious affirmative action programs, and specifically use ―forward-looking‖ reasons for such 
programs). 
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has noted, ―the Michigan opinions contained something for everyone, and 
in so doing, raised more questions than they answered.‖111 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that a remedial rationale for race-
conscious college and university admissions policies lacks either merit or 
persuasive force.
112
 I agree with Professor Laycock when he argues that 
―[t]he case for affirmative action that considers race is much broader and 
deeper than a simple commitment to diversity as Justice Powell used that 
concept in Bakke.‖113 The problem, however, revolves around 
operationalizing the concept of diversity when the weight of opinion 
suggests that the Grutter Court really had remedial concerns as much in 
mind as a core notion of diversity in enhancing the quality of educational 
programs.
114
 Precisely how is a state or local government official supposed 
to invoke this ―diversity-but-not-really‖ rationale for adopting race-
conscious remedial preferences? Moreover, in light of Parents Involved, a 
majority of the Supreme Court no longer appears willing to embrace a 
wink-wink, nudge-nudge approach to strict scrutiny review of race-
 
 
 111. Jones, supra note 18, at 189; see Brown-Nagin, supra note 18, at 1478 (―But the meaning of 
Justice O‘Connor‘s rhetoric enshrining diversity with constitutional significance is far from clear.‖). 
 112. See Levinson, supra note 27, at 587 (―[T]he highest good of an ‗anti-discrimination‘ focus is 
not the achievement of a diverse workforce per se, but, rather, the achievement of a bias-free selection 
process that guarantees to those rejected that they were not victimized by the use of illegitimate criteria 
and to the outside public, including shareholders, that the products are being produced in the most 
efficient manner possible.‖); see also Chang & Smith, supra note 110, at 755 (criticizing the improper 
use of the diversity rationale in order to avoid making potentially embarrassing admissions about past 
discriminatory behavior, amounting to ―a guilty plea of sorts to the charge of racism,‖ and arguing that 
―[i]nstead of, or in addition to, pursuing diversity as a stand-alone rationale, schools should be paying 
more attention to race-conscious programs as a remedy‖). 
 113. Laycock, supra note 22, at 1840; see Chang & Smith, supra note 110, at 755 (arguing that 
ample remedial grounds exist to support race-conscious public school access policies, if only local 
public school districts were sufficiently committed to locating and using the available evidence of past 
discrimination). 
 114. One possible explanation for the lack of consistency in Justice O‘Connor‘s Grutter opinion 
would be that she accepted de facto a remedial justification in the guise of promoting diversity, but did 
so primarily to protect existing reliance interests. As Dean Caminker and Professor Amar put it, Justice 
O‘Connor  
self-consciously approaches the next twenty-five years willing to tolerate a transitional state 
of constitutional affairs as we move slowly from where we are today to a state she would 
prefer, where we use means other than race consciousness to attain the desirable diversity (if 
any affirmative means remain necessary at all).  
Amar & Caminker, supra note 91, at 551; see also id. at 547–50 (exploring the importance of reliance 
interests to the Grutter holding). In light of the reliance interest, Caminker and Amar ―speculate [that] 
Justice O‘Connor was somewhat uncomfortable with using race-conscious admissions decisions to 
attain the compelling goal of racial diversity in higher education‖ but ―at the same time, [they] 
surmise, she was worried that an abrupt about-face (rather than gradual weaning) from Bakke would 
immediately, openly and notoriously undo the country‘s recent progress towards a more integrated 
society.‖ Id. at 549. 
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conscious government actions misidentified as diversity efforts, even 
when an obvious remedial rationale exists on the record.
115
 
III. REMEDIATION: A NARROW BUT DEEP JUSTIFICATION FOR RACE 
CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENT ACTION 
Remediation serves as a compelling government interest only when 
deployed by a governmental entity to remediate past racial discrimination 
that it either caused or facilitated through its participation in a 
discriminatory private market. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson makes 
plain that a city government, for example, could adopt remedial measures 
to correct for helping to support and maintain in the past a pervasively 
racially discriminatory construction trades market with its purchases of 
goods and services.
116
 Whether direct or indirect, however, some causal 
nexus must exist between the governmental entity adopting the remedial 
program and the condition to be redressed.
117
 
When remediation serves as the basis for a race-conscious program, 
government has a duty to narrowly tailor the group to be benefitted to the 
scope of the benefit. Thus, in Croson, the city of Richmond failed to 
justify a generic 30% set aside for minority-owned contractors because the 
benefitted groups had not all faced discrimination facilitated by the city 
and because the degree of the preference, 30% of the city‘s net 
construction dollars, did not constitute a reasonably targeted measure to 
undo the contemporary effects of the city‘s past behavior as a supporter of 
a racially discriminatory market for construction-related services.
118
 
 
 
 115. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2761–69 
(2007) (plurality opinion) (rejecting remedial rationale for the diversity plans under review and 
emphatically rejecting Justice Breyer‘s proposed lenient approach to applying strict scrutiny in the 
context of a voluntary public school district integration plan); id. at 2789–90, 2793–94 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (reiterating that strict scrutiny review applies to all race-based government classifications 
and rejecting ―[t]he dissent‘s permissive strict scrutiny (which bears more than a passing resemblance 
to rational-basis review)‖ because a weakened form of strict scrutiny ―could invite widespread 
governmental deployment of racial classifications‖). 
 116. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491–93 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(opining that a local government may adopt measures to prevent racial discrimination in private 
markets and also may ―take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system‖ if it participates in a 
discriminatory private market); id. at 509 (opinion of O‘Connor, J.) (―Nothing we say today precludes 
a state or local entity from taking action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its 
jurisdiction.‖). 
 117. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, 498–500 (plurality opinion) (finding no such causal nexus); 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274–76 (1986) (plurality opinion); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307–10 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (finding no causal nexus). 
 118. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505–08. 
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If we take the Supreme Court seriously, Richmond should have 
adopted a program that benefitted only African Americans, the group that 
suffered past discrimination.
119
 Further, Richmond had a duty to make 
some showing that the market for building trades would include more 
African Americans today than it does but for the city‘s complicity in past 
discrimination.
120
 Precisely how the city should accomplish this task 
remains something of a mystery. How would one establish how many 
African American carpenters or brick masons would be working in 
Richmond if entry into these trades were not restricted based on race fifty 
years ago? In theory, Richmond must proffer some plausible connection 
between the degree of benefit and the attainment of a market that would 
look like a hypothetical market that would have existed but for the past 
racial discrimination.
121
 
The federal government, in addressing racial discrimination at the 
national level, might be able to adopt remedial programs that broadly 
include mutiple racial and ethnic groups. Indeed, Fullilove v. Klutznick 
approved just such a program
122
 and both Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena
123
 and Croson
124
 reaffirmed the proposition that Congress, in 
addressing a problem of national scope, may adopt a remedy that is 
national in scope.
125
 For local governments, however, the narrow tailoring 
requirement creates a very difficult problem. 
 
 
 119. See id. at 505–06. 
 120. Id. at 507–08. 
 121. See id. at 509–11. 
 122. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 486–89 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding on 
remedial grounds a national affirmative action program that reserved subcontracts for disadvantaged 
business enterprises, including businesses owned by members of certain designated racial and ethnic 
minority groups). 
 123. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (―The unhappy persistence of 
both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this 
country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.‖). 
 124. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (―Congress has made national findings that there has been societal 
discrimination in a host of fields‖ and has also ―explicitly recognized that the scope of the problem 
would vary from market area to market area.‖) However, the Court held that, with respect to the local 
program that the City of Richmond had adopted, ―the random inclusion of racial groups that, as a 
practical matter, may never have suffered from discrimination in the construction industry in 
Richmond suggests that perhaps the city‘s purpose was not in fact to remedy past discrimination.‖).  
 125. But cf. Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep‘t of Def., 545 F.3d 1023, 1045, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(invalidating a federal remedial affirmative action program under an equal protection challenge 
because ―the defects . . . noted [in disparity studies used to support a nationwide race-conscious 
remedial program] detract dramatically from the probative value of these six studies, and, in 
conjunction with their limited geographic coverage, render the studies insufficient to form the 
statistical core of the ‗strong basis in evidence‘ required to uphold the statute‖); id. at 1050 
(―[B]ecause Congress did not have a ‗strong basis in evidence‘ upon which to conclude that [the 
Department of Defense] was a passive participant in pervasive, nationwide racial discrimination—at 
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In Phoenix, Arizona, for example, the history of local racial 
discrimination reflects bias against Hispanics of Mexican origin and 
certain Native American groups, notably including members of the 
Apache and Navajo tribes (the tribes whose historical lands are most 
proximate geographically to Phoenix). If Phoenix were to adopt a remedial 
affirmative action program for city building projects, it logically would 
extend a preference only to businesses owned by persons of Chicano, 
Navajo, and Apache ancestry.
126
 Given the fact of general social 
discrimination in both Arizona and the nation against other racial 
minorities, however, and the presence of voters belonging to these groups 
in contemporary Phoenix, a constitutionally permissible remedial program 
that would benefit any persons of Chicano, Navajo, and Apache ancestry 
would likely prove to be politically toxic. In other words, a city council 
member desirous of holding her seat in the next election would either 
oppose the targeted program or insist that the program be amended to 
include members of other minority groups who have historically suffered 
from both official and social discrimination, even though the 
discrimination was not actually present in Phoenix because members of 
the particular minority group did not reside in Phoenix prior to the 
enactment of comprehensive federal civil rights statutes, including the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964
127
 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
128
 
No prudent local politician will tell African American, Asian, and 
Hispanic voters not of Mexican ancestry that they are to be excluded from 
an affirmative action program because, as an historical fact, the city of 
Phoenix neither discriminated against their group nor helped to sustain 
private markets that discriminated against them. Yet, Croson‘s narrow-
 
 
least not on the evidence produced by [the Department of Defense] and relied on by the district 
court—the statute fails strict scrutiny.‖). 
 126. See Builders Ass‘n of Greater Chi. v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(invalidating Cook County, Illinois‘s remedial affirmative action program on overinclusiveness 
grounds because ―[t]he concern with racial discrimination [in Cook County] does not extend to 
Spanish or Portuguese people, or the concern with ethnic discrimination to persons of Spanish or 
Portuguese ancestry born in the United States‖); see also Jana Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep‘t 
of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 2006) (―We conclude that the narrow-tailoring requirement 
allows New York to identify which groups it is prepared to prove are in need of affirmative action 
without demonstrating conclusively that no other groups merit inclusion.‖); id. at 208–09 (―But 
whether or not, in light of Croson, it would be constitutionally permissible for New York State to 
include persons of Spanish descent in [a state remedial affirmative action program], there can be no 
question that New York risks having its MBE program struck down if it expands it further than 
necessary to remedy past discrimination in New York.‖). 
 127. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 128. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973bb-1 (2006)). 
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tailoring requirement mandates just such an outcome; it puts local 
government officials in the impossible position of either adopting an 
unconstitutionally overbroad program that conveys a preference on all 
minority groups or adopting no program at all. By way of contrast, a 
federal district court judge does not face the prospect of a plebiscite on her 
performance and can issue a remedial injunction that targets a specific 
group and only that group; unelected federal judges, holding lifetime 
appointments with constitutionally protected salaries,
129
 have the freedom 
to adopt highly targeted, narrowly tailored race-conscious remedies that 
local government and state government officials simply cannot adopt 
without suffering significant political consequences.
130
 
To be sure, Congress has adopted highly targeted remedial legislation 
incident to its Section 5 power
131
 to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
132
 The Freedmen‘s Bureau, including its promise of ―40 
acres and a mule,‖ benefited only African Americans and no other 
minority group.
133
 Congress also has enacted targeted efforts to assist 
Native Americans,
134
 although the efficacy of these programs, as an 
historical matter, is very much open to doubt.
135
 And, most recently, in 
 
 
 129. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (―The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.‖). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167, 171 (1987); see also NAACP v. 
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705–06 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
 131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (―The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.‖).  
 132. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
NEGROES 293–319 (2d ed. 1956) (discussing Reconstruction and various race-conscious programs 
adopted by Congress to facilitate freed slaves‘ transition from slavery to full and equal citizenship); 
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 36–39, 56–61, 152–69 (Daniel J. 
Boorstin ed., 2d ed. 1994) (describing the creation and role of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
Abandoned Lands, commonly known as the ―Freedmen‘s Bureau‖, and the political and social 
conditions in the states of the former Confederacy that necessitated continued congressional activity to 
protect the civil rights of African Americans). 
 133. See Maxine Burkett, Reconciliation and Nonrepetition: A New Paradigm for African-
American Reparations, 86 OR. L. REV. 99, 107–08 & n.22 (2007) (discussing early ―first wave‖ 
reparations for slavery in the United States in the 1860s, including the promise of forty acres of land 
and a mule to farm the land).  
 134. See, e.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2006)); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3269 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006)).  
 135. See THEODORE FISCHBACHER, A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN 
THE EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1967); Daniel M. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and 
Community Control, 25 STAN. L. REV. 489 (1973); see also Indian Appropriation Act of 1891, ch. 543, 
26 Stat. 989. For a brief history of the U.S. government‘s efforts to ―civilize‖ Native American 
children, see C. Eric Davis, Note, In Defense of the Indian Child Welfare Act in Aggravated 
Circumstances, 13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 433, 437–42 (2008). 
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1988, Congress enacted legislation offering remedial payments to the 
victims of the Japanese American relocation and internment program 
during World War II.
136
 But these are the exceptions that prove the rule. 
Moreover, they all addressed very obvious, indeed notorious, acts of racial 
aggression toward African Americans (slavery), Native Americans 
(multigenerational pogrom starting with the Jackson Administration), and 
Japanese Americans (forced relocation, loss of all business and residential 
property, and imprisonment without charge or judicial process during 
World War II). 
Passive participation by a local city government in a pervasively 
racially discriminatory building trades market is not likely to constitute a 
widely known or appreciated fact. Thus, if the political and factual trigger 
for remedial legislation is the metaphysical equivalent of human chattel 
slavery, the forced relocation of Native Americans, or the Japanese 
American internment,
137
 a great deal of government support of racial 
discrimination is going to go unremedied and the contemporary effects of 
the past discrimination will carry forward into the indefinite future. This 
result should not be acceptable—either to people of good will or to the 
incumbent members of the Supreme Court. 
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH TRUTH IN ADVERTISING 
Polling data consistently show that ―remediation‖ is less popular with 
non-minorities as a rationale for race-conscious government action than 
―diversity.‖138 Accordingly, a prudent city council member would invoke 
―diversity‖ rather than ―remediation‖ as a justification for any city‘s race-
conscious program in order to decrease the probability of an angry 
constituent backlash.
139
 The problem, however, is that a constitutionally 
permissible diversity program cannot promote only racial diversity, and, 
 
 
 136. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903. For a discussion of this 
legislation and its relationship to the contemporary debate over reparations for slavery, see Chad W. 
Bryan, Comment, Precedent for Reparations? A Look at Historical Movements for Redress and Where 
Awarding Reparations for Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REV. 599, 601–03, 605 (2003). 
 137. See ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS: PRO & CON, at xv (2006); see also Katrina Miriam 
Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for Redressing Historical Injustices?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 127, 
128–39, 143–47 (2008). 
 138. See infra text and accompanying notes 211–29. 
 139. From a more cynical perspective, a government entity might also invoke the diversity 
rationale in order to avoid making ―a guilty plea of sorts to the charge of racism.‖ Chang & Smith, 
supra note 110, at 755; see Sullivan, supra note 91, at 92, 96–97 (noting that government entities 
might naturally resist making public admissions of past racial wrongdoing and calling instead for the 
development of more positive, ―forward-looking‖ predicates for government race-based affirmative 
action programs).  
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moreover, diversity must plausibly relate to the quality of the 
government‘s enterprise.140 
A. Government Entities Routinely Adopt Remedial Programs Under the 
Rhetorical Rubric of Diversity 
When government adopts a remedial program but intentionally 
mislabels it as a diversity effort, it invites a hostile judicial reaction. At the 
same time, were the government entity to label a remedial program 
truthfully, it would invite a hostile electoral reaction. In the real world, 
governments routinely adopt remedial programs under the rubric of 
―diversity.‖ Several cases reflect this trend, including Metro Broadcasting, 
Inc. v. FCC
141
 and Meredith.
142
 
In Metro Broadcasting, the FCC adopted a preference for granting 
licenses to minority-owned-and-operated radio and television broadcast 
stations.
143
 In comparative hearings to award new licenses, minority-
controlled applicants would receive a preference.
144
 Similarly, the owner 
of a license could transfer an endangered license to a minority-controlled 
company, for not more than 75% of fair market value, under the FCC‘s 
distress sale policy.
145
 The agency defended both programs not on 
remedial grounds, but as a carefully targeted effort to enhance the diversity 
of the airwaves.
146
 In fact, both in its brief and at oral argument, the FCC 
expressly disclaimed any remedial justification for the programs.
147
 
Of course, the agency‘s diversity rationale does not bear up to close 
scrutiny; the FCC‘s effort to merge the race or gender of a station owner 
with a broadcast station‘s programming format lacks persuasive force and 
arguably insults the business acumen of minority station station owners. 
 
 
 140. See supra text and accompanying notes 63–96. 
 141. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 142. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 143. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 554–58. 
 144. Id. at 556–57. 
 145. Id. at 557–58. 
 146. Id. at 566 (―Congress and the FCC have selected the minority ownership policies primarily to 
promote programming diversity, and they urge that such diversity is an important governmental 
objective that can serve as a constitutional basis for the preference policies.‖); see id. at 611 
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (―[I]t is equally clear that the polices challenged in these cases were not 
designed as remedial measures and are in no sense narrowly tailored to remedy identified 
discrimination.‖). 
 147. Id. at 611 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (―The FCC appropriately concedes that its policies 
embodied no remedial purpose, and has disclaimed the possibility that discrimination infected the 
allocation of licenses.‖) (citation omitted); id. at 612 (―The Court evaluates the policies only as 
measures designed to increase programming diversity. I agree that the racial classifications cannot be 
upheld as remedial measures.‖) (citation omitted). 
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No good reason exists to believe that a prudent racial minority station 
owner invariably will program a station unprofitably in order to advance a 
political or ideological agenda grounded in group identity, instead of 
seeking to maximize the station‘s financial returns.148 And, if 
programming aimed toward a particular community would enhance the 
public interest, the owner‘s racial identity need not, and probably will not, 
track the station‘s programming. In other words, race-neutral means exist 
to ensure that a licensee will broadcast programming designed for a 
particular audience or adopt a particular programming format; where 
government can achieve its purpose using race neutral means, in this case, 
conditioning the grant of a license on the licensee‘s agreement to program 
the station in a certain way, narrow tailoring requires that government 
adopt the race-neutral means.
149
 
―Adarand and Croson make clear that government must use race-
neutral means to achieve its objectives whenever such means are both 
available and effective.‖150 Accordingly, Justice O‘Connor‘s dissent in 
Metro Broadcasting has the better of the argument;
151
 the FCC‘s programs 
made little sense as diversity efforts. 
As remedial efforts, however, the programs possessed substantial 
merit. At the time the FCC first distributed radio and television station 
licenses, very few minorities or women received licenses, or had any hope 
of receiving them. The Commission essentially created an all-white, all-
male ownership class by virtue of its distributional rules and procedures. 
Indeed, ―Congress found that ‗the effects of past inequities stemming from 
 
 
 148. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media 
Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 852–55 (2000) (arguing 
that minority and female broadcast station owners will work to maximize shareholder value, consistent 
with their fiduciary obligations, rather than program a station in an unprofitable, or less profitable, 
fashion that correlates with the owner‘s race or gender, noting that actual real-world owner behavior 
validates this view, and concluding that the theory ―that some inextricable link exists between race and 
gender and programming patterns seems, at best, dubious‖). Indeed, ―[i]n many respects, it is insulting 
to assume that minority station owners would be more likely to forego sound business decisions to 
pursue an ideological agenda‖ because ―[f]rom the perspective of an equity holder, the object of the 
enterprise is to make money, not political statements.‖ Id. at 852–53. 
 149. Id. at 856 (―If providing the public with particular programming formats is essential to 
serving the public interest, the Commission could easily deploy regulations that would ensure the 
existence of a wide variety of program formats. Rather than using race as a proxy for programming 
preferences, the Commission could simply condition the grant of a license on programming to a 
particular audience.‖). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 622 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (―The FCC could directly advance 
its interest by requiring licensees to provide programming that the FCC believes would add to 
diversity.‖); id. at 622–23 (―And if the FCC can direct programming in any fashion, it must employ 
that direct means before resorting to indirect race-conscious means.‖). 
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racial and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe 
underrepresentation of minorities in the media of mass 
communications.‘‖152 Notwithstanding this remedial predicate for the 
FCC‘s policies, however, ―Congress and the Commission [did] not justify 
the minority ownership policies strictly as remedies for victims of this 
discrimination . . . .‖153 The question that begs to be asked and answered 
is: ―why not?‖  
If the current ownership of mass media outlets reflects an initial 
distribution that systematically disfavored racial minorities and women, 
the FCC should be free to attempt to undo the contemporary effects of its 
past distributional inequities. In United States v. Fordice,
154
 the Supreme 
Court adopted a very broad notion of causation with respect to the present-
day effects of past discrimination; even though public universities in 
Mississippi had long since ceased to exclude applicants based solely on 
race, the use of entrance examinations, the duplication of certain programs 
at historically white and black state colleges and universities, and the 
continued operation of eight public institutions of higher learning offering 
duplicative and overlapping educational programs all supported the 
conclusion that Mississippi had failed to remediate completely the present-
day effects of its past bad behavior.
155
 
As Justice White explained, ―[i]f the State perpetuates policies and 
practices traceable to its prior system that continue to have segregative 
effects—whether by influencing student enrollment decisions or by 
fostering segregation in other facets of the university system—and such 
policies are without sound educational justification and can be practicably 
eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it has 
dismantled its prior system.‖156 Moreover, this is so ―even though the State 
has abolished the legal requirement that whites and blacks be educated 
separately and has established racially neutral policies not animated by a 
discriminatory purpose.‖157 Justice O‘Connor, in her concurring opinion, 
echoed these views and emphasized that ―[o]nly by eliminating a remnant 
 
 
 152. Id. at 566 (majority opinion); see S. Jenell Trigg, The Federal Communications 
Commission‟s Equal Opportunity Employment Program and the Effect of Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 237, 262 (1996) (―The history of broadcasting in America is 
riddled with discriminatory practices that have prevented minorities and women from full participation 
in employment, management and ownership positions.‖). 
 153. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 566.  
 154. 505 U.S. 717 (1992). 
 155. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 733–43 (1992). 
 156. Id. at 731. 
 157. Id. at 731–32. 
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that unnecessarily continues to foster segregation or by negating insofar as 
possible its segregative impact can the State satisfy its constitutional 
obligation to dismantle the discriminatory system that should, by now, be 
only a distant memory.‖158 
In fashioning a remedy, Justice White emphasized that the Supreme 
Court was making ―no effort to identify an exclusive list of 
unconstitutional remnants of Mississippi‘s prior de jure system‖ and was 
instead delegating the specific identification of existing policies that 
tended to support the continued segregated racial identity of Mississippi‘s 
public colleges and universities to the lower federal courts on remand.
159
 
Thus, the Fordice Court suggested that, on remand, the court of appeals 
―examine, in light of the proper standard, each of the other policies now 
governing the State‘s university system that have been challenged or that 
are challenged on remand in light of the standard that [the Supreme Court] 
articulate[d]‖ for their possible segregative effects.160 Nevertheless, Justice 
White identified and found substantial shortcomings in four general areas 
of public college and university governance: ―admissions standards, 
program duplication, institutional mission assignments, and continued 
operation of all eight public universities.‖161 The Court did not attempt to 
write a detailed remedial decree, however, leaving the specific details of 
implementing the Fordice decision to the lower federal courts.
162
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court‘s mandate to the lower courts was 
remarkably broad in its potential scope.
163
  
The implications of Fordice for remedial affirmative action programs 
are potentially staggering and, for the most part, wholly underutilized, if 
not unutilized. Simply ceasing past discriminatory practices is not a 
sufficient response when path dependence ensures that a state‘s public 
colleges and universities will retain their historical racial identities. 
Consistent with the Fordice mandate, historically white colleges and 
universities in Mississippi could constitutionally seek to overcome path 
dependence by actively and aggressively recruiting African American 
students. Such efforts logically could include targeted recruiting efforts at 
 
 
 158. Id. at 744–45 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
 159. Id. at 733. 
 160. Id.  
 161. See id.; see also id. at 734–43 (discussing segregative effects of the contemporary policies 
and possible responses to cure them). 
 162. Id. at 742–43. 
 163. See id. at 743 (―To the extent that the State has not met its affirmative obligation to dismantle 
its prior dual system, it shall be adjudged in violation of the Constitution and Title VI and remedial 
proceedings shall be conducted.‖).  
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predominantly minority high schools, dedicated scholarships, and active 
promotion of the institution of higher education within the African 
American community. 
If one‘s siblings, parents, aunts, uncles, and grandparents did not attend 
a particular college or university, it becomes less likely that a graduating 
high school senior will attend the school.
164
 The reverse also holds true: if 
a family has strong intergenerational ties to an institution of higher 
learning, it is very likely that a graduating high school senior would 
seriously consider attending the institution.
165
 Yet, these family ties across 
generations are the wake that remains of decades of state enforced de jure 
discrimination. Moreover, absent aggressive, concerted efforts over time, 
these effects will never be erased and the public college or university will 
never come to look as it would have looked but for the past de jure 
discrimination.
166
 
 
 
 164. See Laurie Fox, First-Generation Scholars; Increasing Number of Students Attending 
College Though Parents Didn‟t, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 13, 1998, at A20 (reporting a U.S. 
Department of Education study finding that only 20% of first-generation students apply to and attend a 
four-year college or university if the applicant‘s parents did not attend a four-year university, whereas 
36% of students with parents who attended a four-year institution apply to and attend four-year 
colleges and universities); see also Franco Ordonez, Latinos Strive to Meet College Costs; Support 
Groups Focus on Financial Realities, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2003, at Globe West 1 (―Questions 
such as where to apply and what to study make college decisions daunting for almost any family. But 
higher education can be doubly difficult to navigate for many Latino parents with limited English 
skills, many of whom have never attended college, taken the SATs, applied for financial aid, or sought 
out their own loans.‖). 
 165. See Campus Visit Drives College Choice, STUDENTPOLL, Jan. 29, 2004, http://www.art 
sci.com/StudentPOLL/v5n5/printer-friendly.htm (reporting a 2003 study that found that ―[y]our 
parents or other family members‖ constitute the second most important factor on student college and 
university applications and admissions decisions, with 39% of respondents identifying this factor as a 
significant influence); see also Jonathan Meer & Harvey S. Rosen, Altruism and the Child-Cycle of 
Alumni Donations 13 (CEPS, Working Paper No. 150, 2007), available at http://www.princeton.edu/ 
ceps/workingpapers/150rosen.pdf (reporting a study finding that nearly 53% of college and university 
applicants will apply to their parents‘ alma mater). 
 166. For thoughtful discussions of the importance of historically black colleges and universities to 
the African American community, and the difficulty of convincing non-minorities to enroll at HBCUs, 
see Drew S. Days, III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrated Ideal, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 53, 
63–74 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why 
Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1435–39, 1445–46 (1993); 
Cory Todd Wilson, Note, Mississippi Learning: Curriculum for the Post-Brown Era of Higher 
Education Desegregation, 104 YALE L.J. 243, 256–58, 259–63 (1994). Wilson explains that ―[t]he 
costs to society would simply be too high, especially given the possibility that African-American 
students, particularly those who cannot afford to leave the state, will drop out of the system rather than 
attend predominantly white schools.‖ Wilson, supra, at 262; see id. at 256 n.82 (―In fact, over a third 
of all African-American college applicants in Mississippi who qualify for automatic admission to 
predominantly white schools still choose to go to historically black colleges.‖). On the other hand, 
―[o]ne approach holds that constraints imposed by the white majority distort African-Americans‘ 
choices, forcing them to attend historically black schools they otherwise would not.‖ Id. at 256. 
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The breadth of the remedy, if taken seriously, is jaw dropping, yet 
entirely justified and appropriate. Anything less means that the state 
retains the ―benefit‖ of past unconstitutional action by operating public 
colleges and universities that maintain historical racial identities rooted in 
the Jim Crow era.
167
 In fact, the herculean nature of the task makes it 
highly unlikely that a state university would voluntarily undertake it or 
that a federal court would require a serious and sustained effort on the 
university‘s part to achieve it.168 Moreover, the implications are dire for 
historically black colleges and universities, which would be just as 
obligated as historically white institutions to disestablish their racial 
identities.
169
 After all, the racial identity of these institutions also reflects 
the decision to exclude whites from them as much as to create ―separate 
but equal‖ institutions of higher learning for African Americans.170 
 
 
 167. For examples of this phenomenon in a contemporary context involving the inappropriate 
politicization of civil service appointments in the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Immigration 
Appeals, and other federal agencies, see Eric Lichtblau, Mukasey Won‟t Prosecute for Hiring Bias, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at A19; Charlie Savage, Vetted Judges More Likely to Reject Asylum Bids, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at A17; Charlie Savage, White House Pushed List of „Loyalists‟ for Hire, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008, at A17. By permitting persons hired unlawfully for ideological reasons to 
remain employed, these government agencies will not only look differently, but also will act 
differently, than they would have in the absence of the use of unlawful and inappropriate hiring 
criteria. See Savage, Vetted Judges, supra, at A17 (reporting that immigration judges hired using 
unlawful ideological considerations vote more reliably against those seeking asylum in the United 
States than do immigration judges hired using neutral hiring criteria). 
 168. See Molly L. Mitchell, Comment, A Settlement of Ayers v. Musgrove: Is Mississippi Moving 
Towards Desegregation in Higher Education or Merely a Separate but „More Equal‟ System?, 71 
MISS. L.J. 1011, 1019–26 (2002) (describing and critiquing the final settlement of the Ayers lawsuit, in 
which very little changed at the state‘s public colleges and universities, but all parties agreed to call the 
effort good enough for government work). 
 169. Justice Thomas strongly objected to this possible effect of Fordice, arguing that so long as 
admissions are color blind, the continued existence of historically black public colleges and 
universities does not constitute a constitutional wrong. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 748–49 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); id. at 748 (―In particular, we do not foreclose the possibility that there exists ‗sound 
educational justification‘ for maintaining historically black colleges as such.‖); id. at 749 (―Although I 
agree that a State is not constitutionally required to maintain its historically black institutions as such, I 
do not understand our opinion to hold that a State is forbidden to do so. It would be ironic, to say the 
least, if the institutions that sustained blacks during segregation were themselves destroyed in an effort 
to combat its vestiges.‖) (citation omitted). 
 170.  As of 2010, the student bodies at Mississippi‘s three historically black public colleges and 
universities—Alcorn State University, Jackson State University, and Mississippi Valley State 
University—remain over 90% African American; it would be nonsensical to suggest that these 
institutions have ceased to be racially identifiable state-supported institutions of higher learning. 
Elizabeth Crisp, Mississippi students defend need for HBCUs, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), 
Feb. 22, 2010, at A1 (―More than 13,500 African Americans are enrolled in Mississippi's three public 
historically black universities—Alcorn, Jackson State and Mississippi Valley State. On each campus, 
more than 90 percent of the students are black.‖). That said, the contemporary culture at traditionally 
white public universities in Mississippi, and the continuing legacy of racial mistrust, could in part 
explain this phenomenon. See Shaila Dewan, Debate Host, Too, Has Message of Change, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 24, 2008, at A14 (noting that current minority students at the flagship University of Mississippi 
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It is odd that Fordice has received so little attention from legal 
scholars, legislators, and public institutions that wish to engage in race-
based affirmative action efforts. It establishes a very high bar for 
eradicating the contemporary effects of past discrimination, and, so long 
as a causal nexus exists between the institution‘s contemporary racial 
identity and past segregation,
171
 overt and direct forms of targeted race-
conscious action to eradicate those effects would be perfectly 
constitutional. Notwithstanding sustained good-faith efforts to promote 
integration at institutions of higher learning in Mississippi, the project 
remains very much a work in progress; state institutions, such as the 
University of Mississippi, continue to retain their pre-desegregation racial 
identities.
172
 
If one links the duty to remediate past discrimination, as set forth in 
Fordice, with the means of eradicating past discrimination approved in 
United States v. Paradise,
173
 the scope of remediation as a justification for 
race-conscious government action comes into even clearer focus. The 
federal district court judge in the Paradise litigation, Judge Frank M. 
Johnson, Jr., found that pervasive race discrimination infected the hiring 
decisions of the Alabama Department of Public Safety; for over thirty-
 
 
―point out that the university still has far to go [in creating a hospitable and nurturing environment for 
African American students],‖ citing examples of sources of racial misunderstanding and mistrust 
including, (1) ―At football games, many black students remain seated when the band plays Dixie and 
fans chant ‗The South will rise again.‘,‖ (2) ―A white fraternity still holds an annual Old South party 
where escorts in Rebel uniforms and women in hoop skirts mingle at a plantation,‖ and (3) ―Black 
students are viewed as having virtually no chance of being elected to honorary positions like 
homecoming queen or Miss Ole Miss‖). In sum, ―[w]hat many white students think of as hallowed 
tradition, blacks find an unwelcoming affront.‖ Id. ―‗When we get here,‘ said Nickolaus Luckett, a 
black honor student who is on the student debate steering committee, ‗we see it instantly.‘‖ Id. 
Nevertheless, the Clarion-Ledger reports that African American student enrollment at state colleges 
and universities has increase by 32% over the past ten years, with two-thirds of this growth in minority 
enrollments taking place at previously segregated white institutions of higher learning. Crisp, supra, at 
A1. 
 171. See Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. 
L. REV. 643, 669 (2001) (arguing that theories of causation routinely used in tort law to assess 
responsibility for socially harmful outcomes should logically also inform the assessment of causation 
in the context of equal protection claims). She asks why a ―cause in fact‖ standard should apply when 
inquiring into equal protection violations, whereas much more searching theories of causation are 
sufficient to establish liability in tort. Id. 
 172. See Dewan, supra note 170, at A14 (reporting that at the University of Mississippi ―[b]lack 
students are viewed as having virtually no chance of being elected to honorary positions like 
homecoming queen or Miss Ole Miss. What many white students think of as hallowed tradition, blacks 
find an unwelcoming affront.‖); Kitty Bean Yancey, Ole & New, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 2008, at D1 
(―Many Oxford residents resent being identified with Meredith‘s travails and segregation‖ although 
other local residents argue that ―there‘s a great sense of community‖ without regard to race.). 
 173. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167, 170 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/1
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE ARGOT OF EQUALITY 953 
 
 
 
 
seven years, the department simply refused to hire African American state 
troopers: 
 Plaintiffs have shown without contradiction that the defendants 
have engaged in a blatant and continuous pattern and practice of 
discrimination in hiring in the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety, both as to troopers and supporting personnel. In the thirty-
seven-year history of the patrol there has never been a black trooper 
and the only Negroes ever employed by the department have been 
nonmerit system laborers. This unexplained and unexplainable 
discriminatory conduct by state officials is unquestionably a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
174
 
In order to remediate this blatant and longstanding pattern of overt racial 
discrimination, it would not be sufficient simply to order the department to 
cease discriminating on a prospective basis. ―Under such circumstances as 
exist in these cases, the courts have the authority and the duty not only to 
order an end to discriminatory practices, but also to correct and eliminate 
the present effects of past discrimination.‖175 
Accordingly, Judge Johnson ordered the department to hire one African 
American trooper for every non-African American trooper until African 
Americans comprised not less than 25% of the state trooper ranks.
176
 
Judge Johnson‘s approach to the prospective injunctive relief aimed at 
denying the department the ―benefit‖ of its ill-gotten racial gains. Even if 
the department ceased to engage in its discriminatory hiring practices, 
absent some intervention to disrupt the existing racial composition of the 
force, the existing state trooper ranks would reflect the past discriminatory 
behavior.
177
 Indeed, it could well have taken years, if not decades, before 
the department‘s personnel would cease to reflect the past racially 
discriminatory hiring. And, because of path dependence, the interest of 
African Americans in becoming state troopers would likely lag as 
compared to the interest of whites; if no parent, no uncle or aunt, or no 
grandparent works in a particular line of work, it stands to reason that a 
young person would be less likely to consider seriously pursuing a 
livelihood in that profession. 
 
 
 174. NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 705 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Although the Supreme Court did 
not directly review Judge Johnson‘s decision in Allen, in Paradise the Supreme Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Allen remedy, upholding it. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 154–56, 165–66. 
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. at 706. 
 177. See supra note 62. 
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The Paradise remedy also has a striking feature: the order had the 
effect of precluding the hiring or promotion of other minority candidates 
who were not African American. The injunctions at issue in the Paradise 
litigation required that every other hire and promotion go to an African 
American candidate; this would not only exclude whites from 
consideration, but also Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans. This 
effect, although superficially troubling, is a necessary consequence of a 
targeted remedy aimed at eradicating the present-day effects of past 
discrimination against a particular racial group. 
Had other racial or ethnic groups successfully sued the department and 
established a similar pattern of systematic exclusion after application for 
employment, they too would have been entitled to relief. But, herein lies 
the rub of remediation as a basis for race-conscious government action: it 
is one thing for a federal district judge to order hiring preferences for a 
single minority group, in this case, African Americans; it is quite another 
for a school board or a city council to take such a step. Were such an 
elected body to adopt a similar program that systematically 
disenfranchised other minorities within the community, the political 
consequences would probably be quite severe.
178
 In this sense, highly 
targeted remedial efforts are most likely to be the product of judicial 
proceedings, rather than voluntary efforts adopted by state and local 
governments, or federal agencies like the FCC. 
In fact, a remedial justification would strongly support both programs 
at issue in Metro Broadcasting. If the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety in Paradise may constitutionally be required to hire one African 
American for every non-African American and to promote African 
American candidates within the state trooper ranks in a race-conscious 
fashion,
179
 by parity of logic, the FCC could adopt aggressive remedial 
programs designed to distribute licenses to groups that were categorically 
excluded from receiving licenses in the past.
180
 
 
 
 178. This political fact of life helps to explain, at least in part, why the Richmond, Virginia, city 
council adopted a very broad-based definition of disadvantaged business enterprise when adopting the 
policy at issue in Croson. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477–78, 506 
(1989). Had the city council established a preference solely for black persons working in the 
construction trades, it is likely that other minorities within the community would have strongly 
objected to the program. 
 179. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166–86 (1987) (plurality opinion); id. at 186, 
188–89 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 189–90, 194–95 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although she 
dissented in Paradise, see id. at 196 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting), Justice O‘Connor later cited the 
holding in Paradise with approval. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). 
 180. See Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 148, at 847–52. 
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Justice O‘Connor, dissenting in Metro Broadcasting, conceded that 
―despite the harms that may attend the Government‘s use of racial 
classifications, we have repeatedly recognized that the Government 
possesses a compelling interest in remedying the effects of identified race 
discrimination.‖181 The FCC failed to award many licenses to either racial 
minorities or women in the initial distribution of radio and television 
station licenses through comparative hearings;
182
 subsequent market 
transactions have never cured this initial distributional imbalance. 
Moreover, the FCC consistently failed to discipline licensees who used 
their broadcast licenses to oppose equal rights and to support overt forms 
of state-sponsored racial discrimination.
183
 Beyond an initial distribution 
of broadcast licenses to white men, the FCC failed to make any effort to 
prevent abuse of these licenses, in ways that would likely lead racial 
minorities and women to perceive the broadcasting industry as an 
inhospitable place to work. 
The remedial rationale extends not only to regulatory schemes that 
denied opportunities based on race, such as a de facto policy of not issuing 
broadcast station licenses to minority applicants, but also to government 
actions that help to facilitate private forms of racial discrimination. ―Thus, 
if the [FCC] could show that it had essentially become a ‗passive 
participant‘ in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the 
local [broadcasting] industry, we think it clear that the [agency] could take 
affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.‖184 The Croson Court 
explained that ―[i]t is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or 
federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn 
from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of 
 
 
 181. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 611 (1990) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 182. See id. at 621–22; Leonard M. Baynes, Making the Case for a Compelling Government 
Interest and Re-Establishing FCC Affirmative Action Programs for Broadcast Licensing, 57 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 235, 261–93 (2004) (advancing six different theories on which a federal court could find that 
the FCC discriminated in the distribution of broadcast station licenses, in the renewal of these licenses, 
and also in the markets for various broadcast services, including advertising); see also Trigg, supra 
note 152, at 262. 
 183. See, e.g., Office of Commc‘n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 
1966) (rebuking Commission for renewing license of a Jackson, Mississippi, television station, 
WLBT, which openly advocated racism and consistently provided false, negative coverage of the civil 
rights movement); Mary Tabor, Note, Encouraging “those who would speak out with fresh voice” 
Through the Federal Communications Commission‟s Minority Ownership Policies, 76 IOWA L. REV. 
609, 612–16 (1991) (analyzing and criticizing the ―FCC Tolerance for Racism‖ in its licensing 
decisions from the 1960s to the 1970s). For an excellent history of the Commission‘s persistent failure 
to reign in openly racist broadcasters during the Civil Rights Era, see STEVEN D. CLASSEN, WATCHING 
JIM CROW: THE STRUGGLES OVER MISSISSIPPI TV, 1955–1969 (2004). 
 184. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989). 
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private prejudice.‖185 Accordingly, in order to justify race-conscious 
remedial action, the FCC need not document a policy of discrimination 
itself, provided that it could document that it knowingly licensed 
broadcasters that engaged in unconstitutional forms of discrimination and 
subsequently renewed those broadcasters‘ licenses, repeatedly, thereby 
facilitating ―the evil of private prejudice‖ not only with taxpayer dollars, 
but also with the public airwaves. 
Why, then, did the FCC litigate the case on a diversity rationale? My 
thesis is that the politics of diversity are far less stormy than the politics of 
remediation; no government entity wishes to state publicly that ―we 
discriminated in the past and must make up for it now.‖186 Moreover, an 
agency is also unlikely to admit readily that it stood by and did nothing 
when faced with incontrovertible evidence of private racism by others, 
resulting in private racism directly advanced and facilitated by the 
agency‘s regulatory and licensing decisions.187 It is much easier to invoke 
the soothing, but ill-defined, concept of advancing ―diversity‖ but to limit 
the ―diversity‖ program to track essentially remedial concerns—even 
though this means ―affirmative action,‖ ―remediation,‖ and ―diversity‖ all 
become essentially synonymous concepts with entirely overlapping 
purposes and objectives. This might make the adoption of remedial 
measures more politically palatable, but it dooms the actions to judicial 
 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Sullivan, supra note 91, at 92 (―Making sins of past discrimination the justification for 
affirmative action, however, dooms affirmative action to further challenge even while legitimating it‖ 
because ―it subjects affirmative action plans to potentially protracted litigation over the ‗factual 
predicate‘ for adopting them: how much past discrimination is enough?‖ and ―having to ask that 
question may deter implementation of voluntary affirmative action at all‖); see also Chang & Smith, 
supra note 110, at 755 (observing that government agencies are unlikely to offer voluntarily ―a guilty 
plea of sorts to the charge of racism‖ and also noting that the ―research and documentation‖ required to 
support an agency‘s claim that a race-conscious program constitutes a narrowly tailored remedy for 
such past racial wrongdoing, if challenged in federal court, ―would be expensive to document‖); Karst, 
supra note 91, at 64 (agreeing with Professor Sullivan that a focus on ―remedying specified past 
discrimination‖ could ―make affirmative action politically acceptable‖ but ―self-defeating‖).  
 187. Professor Sullivan notes that predicating affirmative action on past discrimination ―is against 
employers‘ and unions‘ self-interest, and indeed, may invite race discrimination lawsuits by 
nonwhites.‖ She suggests that ―the task of self-judgment and self-condemnation in any form casts a 
chill over efforts to implement affirmative action voluntarily‖ if predicated on a remedial basis. 
Sullivan, supra note 91, at 92. In addition, ―viewing affirmative action as penance for past 
discrimination invites claims that the focus on that discrimination should be sharper.‖ Id. This, in turn, 
would logically imply that remedial efforts be so targeted with respect to the beneficiaries as to 
become politically untenable because no rational city council member, county commissioner, or state 
legislator would vote in favor of a remedial program that applies to some but not all minorities in order 
to be sufficiently tailored to meet constitutional narrow tailoring requirements. See supra text and 
accompanying notes 122–37.  
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invalidation if a person or entity burdened by the program elects to hail the 
agency into court. 
Returning to the Jefferson County, Kentucky, public schools in Parents 
Involved, it is clear that a remedial justification for tracking African 
American enrollment would exist in a school district that practiced overt 
de jure segregation of the races until the 1970s and did not exit continuing 
judicial scrutiny of the operation of its schools until 2000.
188
 Chief Justice 
Roberts suggested that, having achieved unitary status,
189
 Jefferson County 
simply could not invoke a remedial rationale for race-conscious 
assignment policies.
190
 He writes, ―We have emphasized that the harm 
being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is 
traceable to segregation, and that ‗the Constitution is not violated by racial 
imbalance in the schools, without more.‘‖191 Thus, ―[o]nce Jefferson 
County achieved unitary status, it had remedied the constitutional wrong 
that allowed race-based assignments. Any continued use of race must be 
justified on some other basis.‖192 It is not at all clear, however, that Chief 
Justice Roberts has this right. 
To be sure, the concept of ―unitary status‖ implies that continuing 
judicial supervision of a public school system is no longer warranted, 
whether ―in whole or in part‖,193 because the district has ended its 
discriminatory practices and reduced its contemporary effects to the extent 
practicable.
194
 In a larger sense, however, the notion that any district has 
truly eradicated all contemporary vestiges of de jure segregation is a legal 
 
 
 188. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2752 
(2007). 
 189. On the concept of ―unitary status,‖ see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 473, 486–87 (1992); 
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245–46 (1991). 
 190. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752 (noting that the Jefferson County school district did 
not invoke a remedial rationale for its program because it achieved unitary status under the Freeman 
standards in 2000); see also id. at 2749 (giving history of federal court supervised desegregation of the 
Louisville public schools, beginning in 1973 and ending in 2000). 
 191. Id. at 2752. 
 192. Id. 
 193. A public school district subject to a desegregation order may seek and obtain unitary status 
on a piecemeal basis rather than on a comprehensive basis. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490–91. 
 194. See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247–50 (1991); see, e.g., Hampton 
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (releasing the Jefferson 
County public school district from continuing judicial supervision under a 1973 desegregation order 
because the defendant school district had achieved unitary status by eliminating ―[t]o the greatest 
extent practicable‖ the vestiges of its prior policy of segregation). For a detailed discussion of the 
concept of unitary status and the problems associated with its relatively vague contours, see Daniel J. 
McMullen & Irene Hirata McMullen, Stubborn Facts of History—The Vestiges of Past Discrimination 
in School Desegregation Cases, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 75 (1993); Wendy Parker, The Future of 
School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1161–80 (2000); Susan Poser, Termination of 
Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283 (2002).  
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fiction;
195
 the identity of particular schools within the community are a 
present fact rooted in the past, as are residential housing patterns that 
developed, at least in part, due to the geographic boundaries associated 
with public school assignments.
196
 Unitary status is more a form of judicial 
surrender than a genuine declaration of victory.
197
 
The federal courts also have made plain their antipathy for serving as 
school boards of last resort. In a variety of contexts, including procedural 
due process,
198
 student free expression rights,
199
 school library collection 
decisions,
200
 and public employment,
201
 the Supreme Court has indicated 
that local school boards deserve a wide margin of appreciation
202
 for 
 
 
 195. See Ryan, supra note 41, at 132 (―The truth is that racial integration is not on the agenda of 
most school districts and has not been for over twenty years.‖). 
 196. For a discussion of another contributor to the racial identity of public schools, see Wendy 
Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (2008) (arguing that teacher assignments 
in many public school districts reflect the racial composition of a particular school‘s student body, that 
this results in significant, racially identifiable differences in teacher experience, and that ―[t]he 
inequality caused by teacher segregation also reveals the transformative power of integration‖). 
Professor Parker is quite correct to state that ―[a]s a society, we too often ignore the consequences of 
school segregation, and pretend any inequities are entirely nonracial in cause and effect.‖ Id. at 52. 
 197. See id. at 33–40, 49–51 (noting the failure of the Brown line of cases to achieve meaningful 
integration of the public schools in most public school districts, noting that increasing racial 
integration within public schools generally does not constitute a priority for contemporary school 
boards, and criticizing the ―disinterest [in integration] found in the overwhelming majority of school 
districts‖). 
 198. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 199. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that students in public schools hold ―First Amendment 
rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,‖ noting that ―[i]t can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate,‖ and observing that ―[t]his has been the unmistakable holding of 
this Court for almost 50 years‖); see S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs—Repression, 
Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 119–20, 126–37 
(1995) (discussing and critiquing the Supreme Court‘s Tinker line of free speech cases involving 
speech and expressive conduct by public school students in the public schools). 
 200. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (permitting school libraries absolute discretion to 
select books for school libraries as an incident of their control over the curriculum and holding that 
judges should not superintend such decisions, but limiting the ability of a school board to remove a 
book previously selected for the collection, but only if the reason for doing so relates to viewpoint 
discrimination as opposed to curricular concerns); ACLU of Fla. v. Miami-Dade Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 
1177, 1183–90, 1199–1203, 1211–22 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 659 (2009) (upholding 
removal of Vamos a Cuba from school district library shelves because the decision rested on a 
legitimate pedagogical purpose, rather than on viewpoint discrimination). 
 201. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 202. The concept of a ―margin of appreciation‖ derives from the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 
164–65 (1981); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 10 (1978); see also 
J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 148 (1988) (discussing the concept of the ―margin of appreciation‖ in the European Court of 
Human Rights‘s jurisprudence). I have borrowed the concept in this context to suggest that the 
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making basic decisions associated with running the local schools. As the 
Court has explained, ―local autonomy of school districts is a vital national 
tradition.‖203 The same sort of reflexive judicial deference also manifests 
in cases involving the operation of prisons
204
 and the military.
205
 
Given this de facto thumb on the scale in favor of local control and 
autonomy with respect to the operation of the public schools, it would be 
entirely sensible to have a reasonably generous floor for establishing that a 
district has done all that it must do in order to desegregate. To say, 
however, that a school district has done all that it must do is not 
necessarily to say that it has done all that it may do; one could reasonably 
posit a floor, the satisfaction of which would support a finding of unitary 
status, but also the existence of a higher ceiling, which would permit a 
local school district, after having achieved unitary status, to continue 
voluntary efforts at ameliorating the continuing contemporary effects of 
past discrimination. 
Indeed, even the majority opinion of Freeman v. Pitts, authored by 
Justice Kennedy, frankly acknowledged that achieving unitary status was 
not contingent on total success in undoing the present effects of past 
 
 
Supreme Court of the United States enforces constitutional rights against certain government 
defendants more leniently than against others, conveying a kind of ―margin of appreciation‖ on 
favored government entities, such as the military, prisons, and public school authorities. 
 203. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977). 
 204. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners‘ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125–26, 128 (1977) (―The 
necessary and correct result of our deference to the informed discretion of prison administrators 
permits them, and not the courts, to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations 
. . . .‖); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 827–28 (1974) (rejecting First Amendment claims of the 
media to access inmates and inmates to speak with the media because of ―legitimate penological 
objectives of the corrections system‖ in limiting such access); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
87, 91, 95–99 (1987) (holding that prisons may limit prisoners‘ exercise of fundamental constitutional 
rights, including the right to marry, as necessary to secure legitimate penological interests, provided 
that a restriction is ―reasonably related‖ to such interests, but invalidating a flat ban against inmates 
marrying while incarcerated). The Supreme Court has essentially reduced its scrutiny of First 
Amendment claims in the context of prisons to a true rationality standard under which prison 
authorities may suspend speech, association, and assembly rights more or less at will: ―Because the 
realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we have also recognized the 
wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison administrators.‖ Jones, 433 U.S. at 126. 
 205. Compare Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that Fort Dix, an Army military 
base otherwise open to the public and in many material respects resembling a town, may categorically 
ban all political speech activity within its borders without any showing that proposed speech activity 
would impair any military functions), and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508–10 (1986) 
(upholding against a free exercise of religion challenge the military ban on armed forces personnel 
wearing any visible unauthorized articles of clothing, including a yarmulke), with Marsh v. Alabama, 
326 U.S. 501, 508–510 (1946) (reversing criminal trespass conviction on free speech grounds and 
holding that a company-owned town could not proscribe speech activity within the town center 
because the private owner had assumed the role of a municipal corporation in all material respects), 
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requiring South Carolina to pay unemployment benefits 
to applicant unable to obtain employment because of a religious objection to working on Saturdays). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
960 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:907 
 
 
 
 
discrimination.
206
 If this sentiment is sincere, it stands to reason that a 
school district might wish to escape continuing district court jurisdiction 
over a desegregation order, even though the local school board and 
superintendent believe that continued efforts to redress the contemporary 
effects of past discrimination remain vitally important and necessary. 
The notion of a constitutionally required floor with a higher voluntary 
ceiling is hardly a novelty to contemporary constitutional law. For 
example, even though the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment 
does not, of its own force, require a privately owned shopping mall owner 
to provide access to the property for those who wish to engage in 
expressive activities,
207
 a state may, as a matter of statutory law or through 
interpretation of the state constitution‘s free speech guarantee, order third-
party access to such spaces for the purpose of engaging in expressive 
activities.
208
 In other words, the constitutionally required ―floor‖ does not 
preclude Congress, a state, or a local government from establishing a 
broader duty to provide public access to private property for speech 
activity. This directly impedes the free speech interests of the property 
owner in not being forced to dissociate itself from the third-party speech 
or risk being misidentified with it. Thus, a rule mandating third-party 
access to private mall property comes at the price of the mall owner‘s free 
speech interests, yet the balance is one that Congress or a state or local 
government may choose to strike in favor of third-party access.
209
 
 
 
 206. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495 (―In one sense of the term, vestiges of past segregation by state 
decree do remain in our society and in our schools. Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed 
by the State and in its name, are a stubborn fact of history. And stubborn facts of history linger and 
persist.‖). 
 207. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567–70 (1972). 
 208. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 209. Obscenity doctrine provides another example in which the states and, in theory, Congress are 
free to protect more speech than the First Amendment requires. See, e.g., State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 
17 (Or. 1987) (―We hold that characterizing expression as ‗obscenity,‘ [which is not protected under 
the U.S. Constitution] does not deprive it of protection under the Oregon Constitution.‖); see also City 
of Nyssa v. Dufloth, 121 P.3d 639, 643–44 (Or. 2005) (applying Ciancanelli to invalidate a local 
ordinance that prohibited nude dancers from performing within four feet of patrons); State v. 
Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 618–20, 633–35 (Or. 2005) (reaffirming the continuing validity of Henry 
and extending the holding to expressly include totally nude dancing). However, because the harm 
resulting to third parties from the ―overprotection‖ of obscene speech, at least if viewed from the 
vantage of federal constitutional law, is less targeted and is more widely distributed than the burden of 
forced third-party access to private property for expressive activities, the analogy to Pruneyard, 447 
U.S. 74, seems more apt. If third-party property owners must suffer a diminution of their right not to 
speak or to subsidize the speech of third parties with whom they disagree, it stands to reason that 
efforts to remediate past discrimination might impose costs on groups that did not suffer from de jure 
racial discrimination. In this sense, the Louisville school district‘s use of ―black‖ and ―other‖ to 
analyze the racial composition of the local schools, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle 
School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746, 2754 (2007), makes perfect sense: any effort to measure 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/1
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE ARGOT OF EQUALITY 961 
 
 
 
 
Of course, the Louisville public school district never made any effort to 
defend the program in remedial terms before the federal courts. The fact 
that the school board adopted the plan in 2001, the year immediately after 
the local federal district court ceased its ongoing monitoring of the school 
district‘s efforts to undo the present effects of past racial discrimination, 
however, bespeaks a remedial purpose. The design of the Louisville plan, 
tracking black and ―other‖ enrollments also strongly suggests a remedial, 
rather than diversity, motivation for the plan.  
Although ―[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a 
compelling government educational goal a school district may pursue,‖210 
the Louisville schools were not seriously pursuing diversity. The question 
that then arises and begs to be answered is ―why didn‘t the attorneys for 
the school board brief and argue a remedial rationale for the program?‖ 
The answer to that question cannot be discerned from the face of the briefs 
or the transcript of the oral argument; survey data, however, strongly 
suggest that public opposition to race-based remedial efforts could have 
informed the school board‘s public pronouncements about the ―diversity‖ 
plan and also its litigation strategy.
211
  
B. Remediation and Reparations Enjoy Weak Public Support and 
Engender Fierce Opposition 
Polling data conclusively demonstrate that diversity concerns resonate 
more positively with the contemporary American public, and particularly 
with white citizens, than do concerns rooted in remediation and 
distributive justice.
212
 The ―data indicates that while the public generally 
 
 
progress toward undoing the past effects of targeted discrimination against African Americans would, 
of necessity, require measuring the population of Louisville schools in terms of ―black‖ and ―non-
black‖ or ―other‖ students.  
 210. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 211. See Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 365–66 (2003) 
(―With elected officials opposing quotas and opinion polls showing popular opposition to racial 
preferences in college admissions (despite a poll showing that eighty percent of Americans also think 
it important for colleges to have ‗a racially diverse student body‘), proponents of affirmative action 
had reason to fear the Court would approve affirmative action but narrow the ways in which schools 
could consider race.‖). Indeed, the Supreme Court itself arguably incorporated public opinion on these 
questions to help inform its decision in Grutter. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 18, at 1487 (―Grutter 
offers no coherent theory of justice because it gives every major constituency involved in the 
affirmative action debate a bit of what it wanted to hear. The dominant rhetorical tone of the opinion is 
moderate, elitist, and utilitarian.‖); Post, supra note 110, at 8 (arguing that ―constitutional law and 
culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn 
regulates culture‖ and suggesting that the ―beliefs and values of non-judicial actors‖ help to explain the 
outcome in Grutter). 
 212. See infra text and accompanying notes 212–29. 
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tends to regard diversity favorably, there is large-scale resistance to 
diversity measures focused on race (even in areas where diversity is more 
likely to be favored, like education and employment).‖213 Diversity 
provides a clever means of avoiding a topic that makes many people 
uncomfortable. 
As Professor Jones has posited, ―[b]y shifting from a conversation 
about securing access to previously disempowered groups to a dialogue 
about diversity writ in the abstract, people are not forced to ‗soil their 
tongues‘ with words like ‗discrimination‘ and their minds with thoughts 
about how to deal with America‘s history of oppression.‖214 Thus, ―[t]he 
controversial nature of the corrective and distributive justice rationales, 
and their absence from discussions of diversity, explain why diversity 
initiatives may be more palatable to persons outside of the civil rights 
community than more traditional affirmative action programs.‖215 Poll 
after poll show that U.S. citizens oppose ―remedial‖ race-conscious 
government action, but at the same time broadly support government 
efforts to promote ―diversity.‖216 
For example, a comprehensive 1998 survey sponsored by the Ford 
Foundation concluded that ―[v]oters overwhelmingly believe it is critically 
important that people of diverse backgrounds learn how to live and work 
together—the future simply demands it.‖217 This survey encompassed over 
2,011 respondents, all registered voters selected across the nation, and has 
―a margin of error of +/- 2.2% at the 95% confidence interval.‖218 It found 
 
 
 213. Jones, supra note 18, at 179–80; see also Brown-Nagin, supra note 18, at 1525 n.455 (―Polls 
consistently show that Americans, including a near majority of blacks and a majority of Hispanics, 
believe it is unfair to give preferential treatment to minorities if doing so requires lowering ‗standards‘ 
such as test scores.‖). 
 214. Jones, supra note 18, at 180. 
 215. Id. at 174. 
 216. See Schuck, supra note 6, at 54–55 (―Affirmative action has never had much public support, 
‗with little evidence of change over time.‘ The vast majority of Americans, including more than a third 
of blacks and more than 70% of Hispanics, oppose racial preferences in hiring and promotion, with the 
level of this opposition rising somewhat over time.‖); see also HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL 
ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 178–83 (1997); cf. Paul M. Sniderman & 
Edward G. Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race, 30 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 466 (1997). 
 217. DIVERSITY WEB, ASS‘N OF AM. COLLEGES & UNIVS., NATIONAL POLL ON DIVERSITY IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION (1998), http://www.diversityweb.org/research_and_trends/research_evaluation_i 
mpact/campus_community_connections/national_poll.cfm (reproducing report summarizing results of 
Ford Foundation‘s national survey on attitudes toward diversity) [hereinafter ―Ford Foundation 
Survey‖]; see also Sam Fulwood III & Kenneth R. Weiss, Americans in Poll Overwhelmingly See 
Value in Diversity, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 7, 1998, at A5 (reporting on the results of the Ford 
Foundation comprehensive national survey conducted by DYG, a New York based polling firm). Of 
course, as Professor Brown-Nagin has noted, ―Poll data is not necessarily a reliable indicator of actual 
preferences, especially as they relate to race.‖ Brown-Nagin, supra note 18, at 1450 n.59. 
 218. Ford Foundation Survey, supra note 217. 
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that ―the vast majority of American voters support diversity education in 
general and the numerous specific programs which fall under that 
heading.‖219 
Some specific relevant results include findings that 97% of the 
respondents agree that ―[i]n the next generations, people will need to get 
along with people who are not like them,‖ 94% agree that that ―America‘s 
growing diversity makes it more important than ever for all of us to 
understand people who are different than ourselves,‖ and 91% agree that 
―[t]he global economy makes it more important than ever for all of us to 
understand people who are different than ourselves.‖220 With respect to 
diversity in the context of colleges and universities, ―66% ‗think colleges 
and universities should take explicit steps to insure diversity in the student 
body‘‖ and ―75% ‗think colleges and universities should take explicit 
steps to insure diversity among the faculty.‘‖221 It bears noting that 50% of 
respondents to the survey define ―diversity‖ as meaning ―different 
ethnicity, race, nationality or culture,‖ and that this definition dwarfed the 
next most popular definitional response, ―people with different thoughts 
and ideas,‖ at 18%.222 
Other, more recent, polls find similarly strong support for ―diversity,‖ 
both in the context of workplaces and in higher education.
223
 Support for 
―affirmative action‖ also appears to be significantly stronger than support 
for race-based policies in general, and race-based admissions policies in 
particular.
224
 
By way of contrast, surveys on public support for race-based 
affirmative action find a majority of white citizens strongly opposed to 
such practices: ―the idea of making decisions on racial grounds is 
 
 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id.  
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. See Charles Lane, High Court Mirrors Public Sentiment, Rulings „About Right‟ on Key 
Issues, Poll Finds, FT. WAYNE J. GAZETTE, July 8, 2003, at 4 (reporting on 2003 AP poll that found 
80% of respondents found it ―very important‖ or ―somewhat important‖ for a college or university to 
have a racially diverse student body); Linda K. Wertheimer, Few Definitive Answers in Race Poll, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 23, 2003, at 35A (reporting results of nationwide Associated Press poll 
that found 80% support for ―racially diverse student bodies‖ although only 51% of the respondents 
endorsed affirmative action as an acceptable means of achieving ―diversity,‖ with 43% of the 
respondents opposed to the use of such measures); Harvard Graduate School of Education, News 
Features & Releases, National Poll Shows Strong Public Support for Affirmative Action, Diversity on 
College and University Campuses, May 17, 2001 (reporting results of poll finding 64% of respondents 
support ―affirmative action for women and minorities‖). 
 224. See Schuck, supra note 6, at 55–56; see also Gregory Freeman, „Preference‟: Word Inflames 
Debate on Affirmative Action, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 22, 1995, at 13B (―polls have shown 
that the public supports affirmative action but opposes preferential treatment‖). 
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unpopular—especially among whites, who oppose preferences for blacks 
by a 73–22 percent margin in the new Newsweek Poll.‖225 Moreover, 
―[m]inorities are nearly as dubious, opposing preferences for blacks by 56 
–38 percent.‖226 Similarly, an ABC News/Washington Post poll found that 
over two-thirds of respondents supported ―assistance—but not preference‖ 
in affirmative action programs, and that two-thirds of respondents oppose 
―preference‖ programs.227  
Quite literally, then, the devil is in the details; public support or 
opposition to a race-conscious affirmative action (i.e., remedial) program 
depends significantly on how the government entity adopting it describes 
the program to its constituents. As Professor Schuck has explained: 
widespread agreement exists on the value of diversity in school 
classrooms, but support for affirmative action declines the more the 
question characterizes the remedy as ―hard‖ (mandatory; explicit 
preferences; numbers) rather than ―soft‖ (voluntary; focused on 
enhancing opportunity enhancement, as with greater outreach or job 
training; confined to tie-breaking), and the more it describes the 
rationale as redistribution or representation rather than fairness or 
equal opportunity.
228
 
Schuck also observes that the ―public‘s opinion remains decidedly and 
intensely negative, pretty much regardless of how the questions are 
formulated, the state of the economy, or personal financial conditions,‖ 
although he also cautions that ―it is hard to know the precise division of 
opinion.‖229 These conclusions undoubtedly are correct regarding public 
opinion associated with overtly remedial programs and also hold true for 
 
 
 225. Howard Fineman & Tamara Lipper, Spinning Race, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 2003, at 26, 28. 
 226. Id. 
 227. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, Jan. 20, 2003 (released on Jan. 24, 2003); see Lane, supra 
note 223, at 4 (reporting a Fox poll finding overwhelming opposition to ―allowing an applicant‘s race 
to be a factor in college admissions procedures‖ but, at the same time, 49 percent in favor to 43 percent 
opposed to ―affirmative action preferences for racial minorities‖). Professor Gail Heriot has collected 
polling data that she claims shows ―overwhelming white opposition to ‗preferences‘ in hiring or 
college or university admissions.‖ See Gail L. Heriot, Strict Scrutiny, Public Opinion, and Affirmation 
Action on Campus: Should the Courts Find a Narrowly Tailored Solution to a Compelling Need in a 
Policy Most Americans Oppose?, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 225–28 (2003) (collecting, discussing, 
and citing relevant polling data and results). Michael Rosman, general counsel of the Center for 
Individual Rights, also has collected and summarized survey data showing that ―RCDM [race-
conscious decision-making] has become increasingly unpopular‖ and lacks majority support in the 
body politic. See Rosman, supra note 20, at 47, 47–52 (describing and discussing relevant polling 
data). However, neither Heriot nor Rosman address or refute the polling data that show supermajority 
support for ―diversity‖ in a variety of contexts, including college and university admissions programs. 
 228. See Schuck, supra note 6, at 55–56. 
 229. Id. at 56. 
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some affirmative action programs; however, it bears noting that they do 
not hold true with respect to polling data associated with self-described 
efforts to promote ―diversity.‖ In sum, empirical evidence demonstrates 
the existence of deep skepticism—and hostility—towards remedial race-
conscious government action. 
The history of reparations in the United States bears out the implication 
of the polling data; neither Congress nor the states have adopted many 
remedial programs, and those that have been adopted usually make merely 
symbolic or token efforts to compensate the victims and their descendants. 
For example, Congress enacted a remedial program for the victims of the 
Japanese American Internment policy of the Roosevelt Administration.
230
 
The policy was denounced as a gross violation of basic equal protection 
principles even before the end of World War II.
231
 Victims received an 
official apology and cash payments of $20,000 in 1988, over forty years 
after the internment ended and at a time when most of the adult internees 
were quite elderly.
232
 The federal government made no effort either to 
 
 
 230. See War and National Defense Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-
Americans and Aleuts, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 1989b-4 (1990)); see also COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF 
CIVILIANS, JUSTICE DENIED (1982). 
 231. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (―This 
is not a case of keeping people off the streets at night . . . nor a case of temporary exclusion of a citizen 
from an area for his own safety or that of the community, nor a case of offering him an opportunity to 
go temporarily out of an area where his presence might cause danger to himself or to his fellows. On 
the contrary, it is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment 
in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or 
inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. If this be a correct 
statement of the facts disclosed by this record, and facts of which we take judicial notice, I need hardly 
labor the conclusion that Constitutional rights have been violated.‖); id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(―This exclusion of ‗all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien,‘ from the Pacific Coast 
area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to be approved. Such 
exclusion goes over ‗the very brink of constitutional power‘ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.‖); 
see also Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) (―We are of the view that Mitsuye Endo should be 
given her liberty‖ because ―we conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have 
to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its 
leave procedure‖); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (―Distinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or 
discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.‖); id. at 110 
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (―Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent with our 
traditions and ideals. They are at variance with the principles for which we are now waging war.‖). For 
discussion of the Japanese American internment policy and its social, economic, and political effects, 
see ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II 22–40 (2001); RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE 
JAPANESE INTERNMENT (Eric K. Yamamoto et al. eds., 2001). 
 232. See supra note 136. 
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ascertain or compensate for individual internees‘ actual financial losses 
associated with the forced relocation or interest on those economic losses. 
Similarly, a number of state legislatures, including the legislatures of 
Virginia and Maryland, have enacted public apologies for both slavery and 
Jim Crow,
233
 yet none of these bills commit any public resources to 
addressing the contemporary effects of these state-supported policies. 
Although the sentiments of the apologies are laudable, the absence of any 
serious efforts to address the inequities associated with state-sponsored 
slavery and racism seriously undercut the utility of these enactments.
234
 
Moreover, even in cases in which the victims of state-sponsored racism 
and their descendants are either known or knowable, as with, for example, 
the Springfield, Illinois, race riot of 1908,
235
 the East St. Louis, Illinois, 
race riot of 1917,
236
 or the Tulsa, Oklahoma, race riot of 1921,
237
 neither 
 
 
 233. See S.J. Res. 332, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2007); S.J. Res. 6, 2007 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007); 
Wendy Koch, Va. 1st State to Express “Regret” over Slavery, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2007, at 5A. 
Following Virginia and Maryland, several other states, including North Carolina, Alabama, and 
California enacted similar resolutions, as did several major U.S. cities. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra 
Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 
44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (2007). For a general discussion of reparations and the legal arguments 
that undergird it, see Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811 (2006). 
 234. See generally Burkett, supra note 133, at 104–30 (discussing past efforts to make reparations 
for slavery and Jim Crow, canvassing contemporary arguments for and against such reparations, and 
examining potential legal, political, and economic obstacles to the enactment and implementation of 
such measures). The most recent legislative apologies for past racial injustices simply continue the 
preexisting pattern of offering an apology without any form of financial or other restitution. See, e.g., 
William Douglas, Senate Passes Apology for Slavery, SEATTLE TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A4 (noting 
passage by U.S. Senate of a resolution that calls for a formal apology for the practice of human chattel 
slavery in the United States and acknowledges ―the fundamental injustice, brutality, and inhumanity of 
slavery and Jim Crow laws,‖ but does not provide for financial reparations or any other form of 
restitution); Editorial, „Sorry‟ Says Something, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at A28 (―The [California] 
legislation expressing the state‘s ‗profound regret‘ for discriminatory laws is purely symbolic, carrying 
with it no obligation for reparations akin to the $20,000 paid by the federal government in 1988 to 
Japanese and Japanese Americans who were interned during World War II. Which raises a key 
question: Without atonement, how does one assess the value of contrition?‖); Corina Knoll, 
Legislature Apologizes for Past Discrimination against Chinese, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at A3 
(noting the California state legislature‘s passage of a resolution of apology but also observing that the 
resolution failed to include any form of financial or other restitution to the descendents of the 
persecuted Chinese immigrants); California: Apology to Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2009, at 
A23 (noting that ―[t]he California Legislature apologized for the state‘s past persecution of the 
Chinese immigrants who built the state's railroads, gold mines and agriculture industry‖). 
 235. See Christopher Wills, Land of Lincoln Remembers 1908 Attacks on Blacks, SEATTLE TIMES, 
Aug. 10, 2008, at A5 (noting that ―Lincoln‘s city—where Barack Obama launched his presidential 
campaign—is finally commemorating the events that erupted 100 years ago [in August in Springfield, 
Illinois],‖ events that led ―[o]utraged activists‖ to found the NAACP; describing the 1908 riot; and 
reporting that ―[f]or generations, it was ignored in Springfield‖); See also Alfred L. Brophy, 
Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 
94–96 (2004). The Springfield, Illinois, Race Riot ―was overshadowed by larger riots in East St. Louis 
and Tulsa, Okla.‖ Wills, supra, at A5. 
 236. See Alberto B. Lopez, Focusing the Reparations Debate Beyond 1865, 69 TENN. L. REV. 
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state nor local governments have ever agreed to take responsibility for the 
financial losses caused by white mobs that, acting with the active 
encouragement and participation of local law enforcement agencies, 
destroyed in toto entire black economic communities. The ownership of 
the affected businesses would not be difficult to discern; the class of 
potential recipients of reparations would be knowable and limited in 
number. Yet, to date no level of government—federal, state, or local—has 
shown any interest in remediating the economic losses associated with 
these instances of mob violence acting under color of state authority. 
The lack of quick action, even in cases where causation is not in doubt 
and the victims and their lineal descendants could be identified with a high 
degree of confidence, demonstrates quite clearly that governments are 
either unwilling, or perhaps unable, to remediate past discriminatory acts. 
If remediation is a slow, difficult, and ineffectual process in the clearest 
cases of racial injustice, it seems hopelessly optimistic to expect university 
presidents and local school boards to promote remediation of past 
discriminatory practices beyond the constitutionally mandated floor of 
unitary status. Even if a particular university or local school district 
wished to pursue such policies, the probable public reaction to the policies 
would make their adoption and enforcement unduly politically risky. 
C. The Result: Inaction or the Mislabeling of Remedial Programs  
Because of these facts of contemporary political life, remediation is 
likely to be an underutilized basis for race-conscious government action, 
even in circumstances where the government entity could plausibly defend 
a race-conscious program of preferences as narrowly tailored to undo the 
contemporary effects of past discrimination. The easiest, and most 
politically prudent, course of action for a local school board member is 
simply to do nothing after a district achieves unitary status. No adverse 
legal or political consequences flow from such an approach.
238
 If a school 
 
 
653, 674 (2002) (discussing the East St. Louis race riot of 1917). The City of St. Louis, Missouri, did 
pay compensation to the victims of the East St. Louis, Illinois, race riot. See id. at 676. 
 237. See generally ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RACE 
RIOT OF 1921 (2002). In fact, major race riots took place in many U.S. cities from the 1890s into the 
1930s; few if any retain any place in the nation‘s collective consciousness. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
The Current Reparations Debate, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051, 1060–62 (2003). For an excellent 
review of arguments for and against reparations for these events, and for slavery, see BROPHY, 
REPARATIONS PRO & CON, supra note 137. 
 238. And, as a factual matter, this is precisely how most school boards behave in the 
contemporary United States. See Ryan, supra note 41, at 144–46. As Professor Jim Ryan succinctly 
states the issue, ―[t]he first point to recognize, and perhaps the most important, is that the vast majority 
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board member‘s primary goal were retaining her seat, this approach would 
maximize the probability of a happy outcome. 
Suppose, however, that a conscientious school board member believes, 
notwithstanding a federal court finding that the district has achieved 
unitary status, that serious racial inequities, traceable to patterns 
established during the period of de jure segregation, continue to exist and 
result in unequal educational opportunities and outcomes for minority 
children attending the local public schools.
239
 How would such a public 
official logically respond to the polling data showing unremitting hostility 
for remedial race-conscious programs but broad-based support for race-
conscious government action aimed at enhancing ―diversity‖? 
To the extent that local and state governments do adopt remedial 
programs, it is highly likely that they will be mislabeled as ―diversity‖ 
efforts in an effort to wrap them in a more electorally-friendly 
―cellophane‖ wrapper.240 The critical question then becomes whether the 
federal courts will tolerate anything less than absolute truth-in-advertising 
when a government entity pursues a remedial goal under the rubric of 
diversity.
241
 
 
 
of school districts do not take race into account when assigning students.‖ Id. at 144. Ryan estimates 
that at most around 1000 of some 16,000 public school districts consider race when assigning students 
to particular district schools, see id. at 145, and also notes that ―[l]ooking across various accounts of 
race-based student assignment plans, I count fewer than thirty districts that have plans similar to those 
in effect in Seattle and Louisville, where students are given a broad choice among regular public 
schools and where that choice is constrained by racial guidelines.‖ Id. at 146–47.  
 239. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 196, at 37–40 (arguing that great disparities exist with respect to 
teacher experience and quality, that these disparities track race in disturbing, but predictable patterns, 
and positing that contemporary racial disparities among public schools might begin or start with 
teacher experience and quality, but surely do not end there).  
 240. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(―However, when oblique use is made of the taxing power as to matters which substantively are not 
within the powers delegated to Congress, the Court cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously, because 
designedly, an attempt to control conduct which the Constitution left to the responsibility of the States, 
merely because Congress wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue measure.‖). 
Justice Frankfurter‘s point is that the Supreme Court should not credit an implausible reason (viz., ―it‘s 
a tax!‖) for the adoption of a regulatory program simply because if accepted the reason would establish 
the program‘s constitutionality. By parity of logic, if a race-conscious government action for a 
remedial purpose is mislabeled as a diversity program, a reviewing court should consider the real 
reason for the program, rather than the ―cellophane‖ in which the government entity has wrapped it. 
 241. See Devins, supra note 211, at 380–81 (arguing that the Supreme Court‘s approach to 
affirmative action both reflects and incorporates the public‘s complex attitudes toward remedial and 
diversity objectives). Devins states that ―knowing that its decisions would be embraced by elected 
officials and opinion leaders, the Court (by ruling against the college in the face of widespread amicus 
support for the college) was able to appear independent and countermajoritarian without worrying 
about possible political reprisals.‖ Id. at 381; see also Brown-Nagin, supra note 18, at 1467–68 
(observing that ―elites wield a significant degree of influence in the legal spaces that are constitutive 
elements of the American political environment, often through interest groups representing public and 
private interests on a wide range of issues‖ and noting that ―[t]he courts are ‗yet another point of 
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CONCLUSION: PANDEMIC MALAPROPISM AND THE DIFFICULT POLITICS OF 
RACE 
The Supreme Court has established a doctrinal framework on race-
conscious government action that provides theoretical clarity to the 
permissible metes and bounds of both remedial and diversity efforts that 
include some consideration of race. It is simple enough to rehearse the 
rules that permit race to be used to grant benefits or impose burdens in 
order to remediate past discrimination or in order to enhance the quality of 
the government‘s program or better secure attainment of its objectives.242 
Even so, the Justices themselves seem incapable of using these 
classifications in a principled fashion. 
Right-leaning members of the Supreme Court do not take seriously the 
notion that remediation of the contemporary effects of past discrimination 
requires race-conscious government action that benefits a particular racial 
or ethnic group. Limiting a remedial effort only to the persons who 
personally suffered racial discrimination, and thereby disallowing the use 
of group-based injunctive relief, has the effect of allowing a government 
agency to enjoy the ―benefit‖ of the past discrimination well into the 
foreseeable future because those hired under the unconstitutional race-
based standards will remain and race-neutral future hiring will not 
necessarily address the absence of racial minorities in the government 
agency‘s contemporary work force. Paradise243 and Fordice244 both 
properly rejected this approach in favor of a requirement that government 
make serious efforts to undo the contemporary effects of its past bad 
behavior; the government agency has a duty not merely to cease 
discriminating on the basis of race, but also an affirmative duty to undo 
the racially-identifiable work force that resulted from its past unlawful 
behavior. Limiting remedial objectives to persons who have moved into 
other careers, or perhaps even retired from work entirely, constitutes a 
very weak commitment to securing equal protection of the law to all. 
The conservative members of the Supreme Court, particularly Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, also seem utterly insensitive to the notion that in some 
contexts ethnic diversity constitutes an essential consideration in achieving 
 
 
access‘ for elites, and the Supreme Court is more responsive to the perspectives of elites than of 
others—if only because elites are repeat players in the legal process‖). 
 242. See supra text and accompanying notes 5–21 and 26–48. 
 243. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166–71 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 244. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729–32 (1992). 
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a particular government objective;
245
 an all-white occupying force in Iraq 
or Sudan seems less likely to win hearts and minds of the local populations 
than an ethnically diverse occupying force.
246
 So too, a department of 
social services that lacks persons familiar with the language and cultural 
traditions of particular minority groups within the community will simply 
be less effective at protecting children than a department that possesses 
these skills within its workforce.
247
 
If the conservative bloc is too parsimonious in its definition of 
remediation and its willingness to see the value of diversity, the 
progressive wing of the Court appears hopelessly unprincipled when it 
endorses programs that do not rationally advance the government‘s stated 
interest in diversity.
248
 Even if Seattle has an interest in creating and 
maintaining ethnically and racially diverse public high schools, the means 
selected, aggregating all people of color into one undifferentiated mass 
 
 
 245. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2783 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (―The segregationists in Brown embraced the arguments the Court endorsed 
in Plessy. Though Brown decisively rejected those arguments, today‘s dissent replicates them to a 
distressing extent.‖); id. at 2785 (―The similarities between the dissent‘s arguments and the 
segregationists‘ arguments do not stop there. Like the dissent, the segregationists repeatedly cautioned 
the Court to consider practicalities and not to embrace too theoretical a view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.‖); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―I 
join the opinion of the Court, except Part III-C, and except insofar as it may be inconsistent with the 
following: In my view, government can never have a ‗compelling interest‘ in discriminating on the 
basis of race in order to ‗make up‘ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.‖); id. (―To 
pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the most admirable and benign of purposes—is to 
reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race 
privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.‖). 
 246. See WILLIAM B. BRENTS & SARA MORGAN, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. STRATEGY RESEARCH 
PROJECT, AMERICA‘S CULTURAL AWAKENING, Abstract (2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA469107&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (―the military, and the army in 
particular, must genuinely understand the cultures and languages of the places they are sent if they are 
to successfully carry out US foreign policy‖); id. at 5–12 (arguing that U.S. armed forces with more 
diverse, culturally aware, personnel would enhance the effectiveness of U.S. armed forces engaged 
abroad and increase the probability of mission success). Of course, diversity also enhances the 
cohesiveness and effectiveness of the armed forces, independent of its utility in winning hearts and 
minds abroad. See Leach, supra note 80, at 1114–23. 
 247. See supra text and accompanying notes 66–82. 
 248. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting strict 
scrutiny review of voluntary efforts to integrate the public schools, invoking pre-Croson decisions to 
support this proposition); id. at 2817–19 (arguing that the Supreme Court should apply a less 
demanding form of strict scrutiny to the Seattle and Louisville public school diversity programs). 
Justice Kennedy explained the potential shortcomings of Justice Breyer‘s highly permissive approach: 
 As to the dissent, the general conclusions upon which it relies have no principled limit 
and would result in the broad acceptance of governmental racial classifications in areas far 
afield from schooling. The dissent‘s permissive strict scrutiny (which bears more than a 
passing resemblance to rational-basis review) could invite widespread governmental 
deployment of racial classifications.  
Id. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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and treating all people of color as essentially fungible, lacked even a 
rational relationship to a plausible conception of racial diversity in the 
public schools. To vote to uphold such a program is essentially to adopt a 
rule that commits to the political safeguards of equal protection
249
 any self-
described benign race-conscious government action. 
To be sure, John Hart Ely‘s theory of representation reinforcement250 
would support a vision of equal protection that withholds protection from 
members of the political majority in circumstances where the majority 
imposes a burden on itself in order to favor the interests of minorities. If 
this is really the theory that the progressive wing of the Supreme Court 
endorses, then its members should say so openly, rather than engage in a 
game of verbal charades. Such an approach rejects the notion that equal 
protection works to protect individuals, rather than groups, but this hardly 
disqualifies it from serious consideration. 
The larger problem for a minimalist theory of equal protection, at least 
for ―benign‖ forms of race-conscious government action in which a 
majority burdens itself, involves determining precisely what group, or 
groups, constitute the ―majority.‖ In a state like California, in which no 
single racial or ethnic group commands a majority of voters statewide,
251
 
 
 
 249. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 169–70, 194–205 (1980); 
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition 
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); see also Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 956–58 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Given the fact that the Members of 
Congress are elected by the people of the several States, with each State receiving an equivalent 
number of Senators in order to ensure that even the smallest States have a powerful voice in the 
Legislature, it is quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore the sovereignty concerns of their 
constituents. It is far more reasonable to presume that their decisions to impose modest burdens on 
state officials from time to time reflect a considered judgment that the people in each of the States will 
benefit therefrom.‖); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (―In short, 
the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the 
States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete 
limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly 
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially 
created limitations on federal power.‖); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court‟s Two Federalisms, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 66–67, 70–89 (2004) (describing and critiquing the political safeguards argument). But 
see Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–30 (rejecting the argument that the political safeguards of federalism will 
adequately protect state government officers from being commandeered by the federal government). 
 250. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87–104 
(1980).  
 251. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that as of 2008, non-Hispanic whites comprise no more 
than 42.3% of the state‘s population, and are the largest ethnic group within the state. California 
QuickFacts, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 23, 2010), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html. 
California‘s residents also include Hispanics (36.6%), Asians (12.5%), African Americans (6.7%), and 
Native Americans (1.2%). Id. In fact, as of 2010, four states, California, Texas, New Mexico, and 
Hawaii, along with the District of Columbia, have minority-majority populations, i.e., non-Hispanic 
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precisely what group constitutes the majority? How would one apply a 
minimalist theory of equal protection in these circumstances? Moreover, 
as the United States becomes more ethnically diverse in the years to come, 
successfully identifying a ―majority‖ and a ―minority‖ race will become 
harder rather than easier.
252
 
When one steps back from the hyperbolic rhetoric in the Supreme 
Court‘s affirmative action cases, one sees two stark, competing, and 
unrealistic visions for judicial review of benign race-conscious 
government action: the conservative wing of the Court rejects the 
legitimacy of any race-conscious government action, save that which is 
theoretically race neutral, such as compensating the actual victims of past 
discrimination, whereas the progressive wing of the Court sustains 
virtually any race-conscious government action designed to benefit people 
of color. The formal classifications of ―diversity‖ and ―remediation‖ that 
ostensibly limit government race-conscious action are little more than 
empty shells, mere placeholders for a larger, more epic battle about the 
proper role of the federal courts in overseeing democratically accountable 
government entities that adopt benign race-conscious programs, a battle 
that has largely been fought in code words and subtext rather than 
forthrightly. 
All of this tends to support the attitudinalist critique of the classic legal 
model. ―The classic legal model suggests that the path of the law can be 
identified through reasoned analysis of factors internal to the law.‖253 By 
way of contrast, ―the attitudinal model joins the tradition of legal realists 
and critical legal scholars in dismissing the language [of published court 
opinions] as merely a legitimating myth.‖254 The attitudinal model 
―suggests that judicial decisionmaking is not based upon reasoned 
judgment from precedent, but rather upon each judge‘s political ideology 
and the identity of the parties.‖255 
 
 
whites no longer constitute a majority of the state‘s population. Orlando Patterson, Race and Diversity 
in the Age of Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at Book Review 23 (―Over all, minorities now 
constitute slightly over a third of the [U.S.] population; in four states, minorities are the majority: 
Hawaii (75 percent), New Mexico (58 percent), California (57 percent) and Texas (52 percent), as they 
are in the District of Columbia (68 percent).‖). 
 252. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, In Biggest U.S. Cities, Minorities Are at 50%, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
2008, at A28 (―For the first time, Hispanic, black, Asian and other nonwhite residents account for half 
the population of the nation‘s largest cities, according to new census figures.‖). Nor is racial and ethnic 
diversity solely a characteristic of urban America: ―Further, the data document a rapidly growing 
ethnic diversity in small-town America as well.‖ Id. 
 253. Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255 (1997).  
 254. Id. at 263–64. 
 255. Id. at 265; see Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting 
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Empirical studies seeking to ascertain the role of ideology in judging 
have found that it matters, even if the effects of ideology on appellate 
judging do not have predictable, linear outcomes.
256
 For example, ―in most 
of the areas investigated [in the study], the political party of the appointing 
president is a fairly good predictor of how individual judges will vote‖ but 
―there are noteworthy counterexamples to [the] general findings.‖257 The 
correlation depends on the nature of the case presented and breaks down in 
some substantive areas of law, such as ―criminal appeals, takings claims, 
and Commerce Clause challenges to congressional enactments.‖258 It 
should not be surprising then, that ideological variables would warp not 
only the voting behavior of judges but also the development and 
application of legal doctrine in an area as hotly contested as the use of 
racial preferences in government decisionmaking. 
What is perhaps surprising is the failure of the Supreme Court to use its 
nomenclature in a systematic, coherent fashion. Both the conservative and 
liberal wings of the Court are guilty of malapropism in the use of key 
terms of art such as remediation, diversity, and affirmative action; all sides 
attempt to obfuscate the ultimate legal objective, whether the creation of 
an ahistorical ―colorblind‖ constitution or committing affirmative action 
policies to the political branches of the local, state and federal 
governments. 
Professor Schauer posits that ―when institutional designers have 
grounds for believing that decisions will systematically be the product of 
bias, self-interest, insufficient reflection, or simply excess haste, requiring 
decisionmakers to give reasons may counteract some of these 
tendencies.‖259 Moreover, ―[a] reason-giving mandate will also drive out 
illegitimate reasons when they are the only plausible explanation for 
particular outcomes.‖260 When government uses race to impose a burden 
 
 
on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004) 
(―According to the attitudinal model, judges have certain ‗attitudes‘ toward areas of the law, and these 
attitudes are good predictors of judicial votes in difficult cases.‖). But cf. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael 
Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1411–12, 1498–99 (1998) (questioning the explanatory 
force of the behavioralist critique of the classic legal model of judging and noting that ―[w]hile the 
greater than expected influence of several background variables is consistent with the behavioral 
hypothesis, the influence of other environmental and legal factors reveals the inadequacy of 
behavioralism as a fully explanatory model‖). 
 256. See, e.g., Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 255, at 304–06. 
 257. Id. at 305–06. 
 258. Id. at 306. 
 259. Schauer, supra note 8, at 657. 
 260. Id. at 657–58; see Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial 
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 508 (2002) (―Psychological studies suggest 
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or withhold a benefit, the federal courts should demand a very good reason 
to justify the use of a presumptively illegitimate basis for discrimination 
(indeed, the exemplar of an invidious form of discrimination). To the 
extent that existing legal doctrine holds government to a high standard of 
accountability with respect to race-conscious government action,
261
 the 
lessons of racial history in the United States suggest that this approach 
simply reflects pragmatic realism. Accordingly, ―any person, of whatever 
race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the 
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.‖262 
To say that a government entity must proffer a compelling reason when 
hailed into court does not mean, however, that a government entity 
attempting to defend a race-conscious action must be limited solely to the 
content of a press release issued at the time of adoption. If judges 
themselves have difficulty in speaking plainly about race, it would be 
more than a little ironic if reviewing courts refused to consider compelling 
reasons offered in open court simply because the reasons advanced in the 
briefs include reasons not emphasized in the legislative history of the 
program. 
To speak plainly to the point, government entities attempting to defend 
race-conscious action should be free to defend such programs on a 
remedial basis even if the programs are styled ―diversity‖ efforts, and 
reviewing courts should not attempt to enforce estoppel against a 
government agency that offers a plausible and constitutionally sufficient 
remedial justification for an ostensible ―diversity‖ program. Indeed, for 
judges who often decry the utility of legislative history as useless, if not 
meaningless,
263
 it is difficult to understand why a government defendant 
 
 
that accountability, if properly structured, can significantly improve the quality of decisionmaking in 
the sense of minimizing the extent to which individuals unthinkingly rely on inappropriate 
decisionmaking rules or fall prey to psychological biases.‖). Seidenfeld posits that judicial review of 
agency action enhances the quality of agency decisions simply by ―provid[ing] an audience, albeit not 
the only audience, for those engaged in formulating and defending the rule,‖ and concludes that 
―judicial review provides an effective mechanism for enhancing the impact of accountability and 
discouraging the impact of directive leadership.‖ Id. at 509–10, 547. 
 261. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (―Federal racial 
classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.‖); see id. at 223–24 (holding that federal courts must review 
with ―skepticism‖ all race-conscious government actions). 
 262. Id. at 224. 
 263. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17–25, 25–37 (1997); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 31–32 (1988) (noting rise of ―plain meaning‖ 
approaches to statutory interpretation that reject recourse to legislative history materials, critiquing this 
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should be strictly limited to public pronouncements regarding the purpose 
of a particular race-conscious program. At the end of the day, if the 
government can establish a proper remedial purpose and narrow tailoring, 
a reviewing court should sustain the program, regardless of whether or not 
it was labeled an effort to promote ―diversity,‖ instead of as a remedial 
measure.
264
 
The Supreme Court also has a duty to speak plainly regarding the 
differences between diversity and remediation as predicates for benign 
race-conscious government action. When the Justices identify and invoke 
remedial concerns in support of a benign race-conscious government 
program, as in Grutter, the program under judicial review must itself be 
remedial, rather than designed to promote diversity, again, as in Grutter. 
In its Takings Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court sowed 
doctrinal confusion by adopting an open-ended fundamental justice 
inquiry, asking whether a particular regulation that adversely affects the 
value of property ―substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests‖;265 in 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. however, the Supreme Court squarely 
relocated any open-ended fundamental fairness concerns to substantive 
due process.
266
 Lingle makes clear that the Takings Clause relates to the 
misdistribution of the financial burdens of government regulation, not the 
fundamental fairness of such regulation:  
An inquiry of this nature has some logic in the context of a due 
process challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate 
governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs 
afoul of the Due Process Clause. But such a test is not a valid 
 
 
approach to statutory texts as a form of ―judicial activism‖ inconsistent with a meaningful respect for 
legislative policies, and explaining that ―[t]o the extent that a review of the legislative history 
persuades one that the legislature could not have intended what the ‗plain meaning‘ seems to indicate, 
a judge is doing the legislature no favor in enforcing the ‗plain meaning‘‖); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24, 646–48, 650–53 (1990) (discussing the ―new 
textualism,‖ which ―posits that once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration 
of legislative history becomes irrelevant,‖ and Justice Scalia‘s general rejection of the relevance of 
legislative history in statutory interpretation). 
 264. See Schauer, supra note 8, at 647 (―Are 1992‘s decisionmakers committed in 1995 to the 
result indicated by the reasons they gave in 1992, even though when faced with 1995‘s situation they 
realize that what they said in 1992 was not what they should have said? . . . Are reasons actually given 
to be considered commitments, of the same genus as contracts and promises, or are they simply 
noncommitting statements subject to unimpeded defeat in the event of changed or newly discovered 
circumstances?‖). 
 265. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
 266. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–45 (2005). Justice O‘Connor explained 
that ―[a]lthough Agins‘ reliance on [due process] precedents is understandable, the language the Court 
selected was regrettably imprecise.‖ Id. at 542. 
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method of discerning whether private property has been ‗taken‘ for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
267
  
Accordingly, the Lingle Court held that ―the ‗substantially advances‘ 
formula announced in Agins is not a valid method of identifying regulatory 
takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation.‖268 
Thus, in the context of its regulatory takings jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court recognized its own muddying of the waters and the 
unsustainable legal framework that resulted—i.e., the expansion of the 
regulatory takings doctrine in Agins to a point where it effectively and 
completely overlapped the contours of substantive due process. The same 
sort of overlap problem presently exists in the Court‘s deployment of 
diversity as a compelling interest for race-conscious government action 
and, as in Lingle, the Justices need to undertake an effort to keep the 
categories of diversity and remediation reasonably separate and distinct if 
they in fact want government entities to use these as separate and divisible 
legal categories rather than mere synonyms. 
Even if the Justices were to restore some measure of doctrinal clarity to 
the concepts of diversity and remediation, however, a significant problem 
remains: if courts hold government strictly accountable based on labeling 
and legislative histories, the politics of race will essentially preclude any 
voluntary legislative or executive efforts to adopt remedial programs. To 
be clear, at some point a government entity, like the Jefferson County, 
Kentucky, public school board, must actually invoke a remedial 
justification for its program; it would be asking too much of courts to 
suggest that they must provide a defense that a litigant steadfastly refuses 
to mount.
269
 If, however, a defendant is prepared to argue publicly that a 
 
 
 267. Id. at 542 (citation omitted). 
 268. Id. at 545. 
 269. However, this suggestion is perhaps not as farfetched as it might seem at first blush. In the 
context of equal protection and substantive due process challenges to generic economic and social 
legislation, federal courts inquire into whether a particular enactment bears a rational relationship to a 
legitimate state interest. See FCC v. Beach Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–16 (1993) (describing 
and applying the traditional rationality standard of judicial review). In applying this test, the 
government defendant bears virtually no burden of production or persuasion; a reviewing court will 
ask if any theoretical rational basis exists that might render the law minimally rational. See id. Thus, in 
such cases the burden falls entirely on the plaintiff to prove a negative—i.e., the non-existence of any 
set of facts on which a rational legislator might enact the law at issue. Of course, the whole point of 
strict scrutiny is that, in some cases, the government should lose its presumption of constitutional 
action because the specific action in question transgresses a fundamental right or otherwise uses a 
suspect form of classification. Given that race is perhaps the most suspect form of classification, I do 
not propose or endorse having courts, sua sponte, inquire into a remedial justification for a law or 
program that the government defendant has not invoked. Consistent with such an approach, Chief 
Justice Roberts was correct not to inquire into whether the Jefferson County public school district had 
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particular program advances remedial concerns, whether in addition to or 
in lieu of diversity concerns, a reviewing court should consider the 
remedial defense on the merits. 
In an ideal world, governments would say what they mean and mean 
what they say. Alas, we do not live in an ideal world and governments 
often find themselves in the awkward position of saying one thing, while 
doing another. Thus do ―taxes‖ morph into the less politically odious 
―user‘s fees‖ or ―revenue enhancement measures‖ and ―wars‖ magically 
become ―conflicts‖ or ―enforcement actions.‖ Governments routinely 
mischaracterize the nature and purpose of their actions because they 
believe that doing so will make the actions, deemed necessary but not 
popular, less electorally problematic. One might well wonder if 
democratic self-government could go on in the absence of spin. 
Thus, the political reality is that governments will not readily invoke a 
remedial rationale for race-conscious actions, even when a particular 
action has a strong remedial predicate. The question that a reviewing court 
must then ask and answer is whether truth-in-advertising should trump 
voluntary efforts to ameliorate the present-day effects of past 
discrimination. Given that legislative and executive efforts to remediate 
discrimination can be much more comprehensive, and therefore generally 
more effective, than judicial remedies,
270
 it would make sense to 
encourage, rather than discourage, such efforts.  
Permitting governments to say one thing while doing another would 
constitute a modest, relatively picayune, concession to the realities of 
contemporary racial politics. So long as, at the end of the day, a 
government can meet the rigorous demands of strict judicial scrutiny, the 
imperatives of the equal protection principle have been met. Pragmatic 
realism, rather than empty formalism,
271
 would better help to secure racial 
justice in the contemporary United States. 
 
 
designed a narrowly tailored remedial program. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2752 (2008) (―Jefferson County accordingly does not rely upon an 
interest in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination in defending its present use of race 
in assigning students.‖). 
 270. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public 
Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411, 1427–28 (1995) (noting that legislative remedies for 
constitutional violations can be more comprehensive, and thereby more effective, than judicially 
crafted remedies). 
 271. See Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 24–30, 87–93, 96–97 (discussing and criticizing the 
Supreme Court majority‘s undue ―lofty formalism‖ in Parents Involved).  
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